

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The John F. Finn Institute
for Public Safety, Inc.

Binghamton Police Reform and Reinvention:

Current Practice, Community Input, and Empirical Evidence

Robert E. Worden

Hannah Cochran

Sarah J. McLean

Kenan M. Worden

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The John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., is an independent, not-for-profit and non-partisan corporation, whose work is dedicated to the development of criminal justice strategies, programs, and practices that are effective, lawful, and procedurally fair, through the application of social science findings and methods. The Institute conducts social research on matters of public safety and security – crime, public disorder, and the management of criminal justice agencies and partnerships – in collaboration with municipal, county, state, and federal criminal justice agencies, and for their direct benefit. The findings of the Institute's research are also disseminated through other media to criminal justice professionals, academicians, elected public officials, and other interested parties, so that those findings may contribute to a broader body of knowledge about criminal justice and to the practical application of those findings in other settings.

The Finn Institute was established in 2007, building on a set of collaborative projects and relationships with criminal justice agencies dating to 1998. The first of those projects, for which we partnered with the Albany Police Department (APD), was initiated by John Finn, who was at that time the sergeant who commanded the APD's Juvenile Unit. Later promoted to lieutenant and assigned to the department's Administrative Services Bureau, he spearheaded efforts to implement problem-oriented policing, and to develop an institutional capability for analysis that would support problem-solving. The APD's capacity for applying social science methods and results thereupon expanded exponentially, based on Lt. Finn's appreciation for the value of research, his keen aptitude for analysis, and his vision of policing, which entailed the formulation of proactive, data-driven, and – as needed – unconventional strategies to address problems of public safety. Lt. Finn was fatally shot in the line of duty in 2003. The Institute that bears his name honors his life and career by fostering the more effective use of research and analysis within criminal justice agencies, just as Lt. Finn did in the APD.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the opportunity to collaborate with partners in Binghamton and to contribute to the process of reform and reinvention. We acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of Binghamton's Mayor, Richard David, and Deputy Mayor, Jared Kraham, that of the Binghamton Police Department and its Chief, Joseph Zikuski, Assistant Chief John Ryan, Captain Becky Sutliff, and Lt. David Bidwell, and the assistance of Joe Gaynor.

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(cont.)

Introduction

In June, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Executive Order (EO) 203. The EO mandated that every local government with a police agency conduct a "comprehensive review" of police "deployments, strategies, policies, procedures, and practices," and on that basis develop a plan for improvements that would "foster trust, fairness, and legitimacy, and to address any racial bias and disproportionate policing of communities of color." In conducting the review, the EO directs localities to consult with stakeholders, and to consider evidence-based policing strategies. Pursuant to the EO, Binghamton's Mayor Richard David and Chief of Police Joseph Zikuski formed the Binghamton Police Department Reform and Reinvention Collaborative, and they invited the Finn Institute to serve as the research partner to the Collaborative

The Institute assumed three responsibilities as the research partner to the Collaborative. One responsibility was to analyze police data to assess current racial and ethnic disparities in policing in Binghamton. As detailed below, we analyze disparities in personal safety, in stops by police and ensuing searches, in arrests, and in police use of force.

Another responsibility was to systematically analyze the input of the community. To do so, we paired qualitative data collected through the community meetings with written public comment, and supplemented that information with quantitative data gathered through a web-based survey. The former two sources provide greater depth of information, while the latter offers greater breadth. The community meetings served as the primary data collection method and guided the development of the survey instrument. This approach allows us to examine the issues and nuanced perspectives identified by community meeting participants, and to economically gather input from a broad-based audience on matters raised in the meetings and related to police trust, legitimacy, and reform. We caution readers that the survey was not based on a random, probability sample of Binghamton residents and other stakeholders, and it does not form the basis for inferences about the opinions of the Binghamton population; the survey responses are a supplement to the views expressed in the community meetings.

A third responsibility as the research partner to the Collaborative was to gather information about the "deployments, strategies, policies, procedures, and practices" of the Binghamton Police Department (BPD), and assess them against the base of social scientific evidence. Our summary of that assessment is organized in terms of (1) desired outcomes, to address the strategies that contribute to the outcomes, and (2) institutional infrastructure, to address the internal and external structures that facilitate the achievement of those outcomes. We begin with building trust, and address the role of procedural justice at street-, neighborhood-, and leadership-levels. We turn thereafter to internal police department structures, including policies that govern police use of physical force, and those that govern investigatory and traffic stops, and training

on various topics, including procedural justice, implicit bias, and de-escalation. We consider forms of external oversight. We address the functions that police perform and practices that promise to conserve the use of police authority as a resource, including especially practices that minimize police involvement in reducing the demand for illicit drugs or in resolving situations marked by individuals in mental or emotional distress. Finally, we consider violence and crime reduction, and the forms that the evidence- or research-based strategies of hotspots policing, focused deterrence, and street outreach take in Binghamton. For the most part, our review of community input is organized similarly.

We would add that, 53 years ago, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner Commission) issued its report on the causes of the riots of the 1960s.[1] A recent retrospective on the Kerner report observed that, "… the issue of police misconduct was recognized to be a 'trigger' or 'inciting incident' but was not the truer, deeper cause of unrest. Rather, instances of police abuse were the most salient and visible aspect of a larger system of inequity."[2] The Commission reached the unsettling conclusion that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal."[3]

From the beating of Rodney King by police in 1991, the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in 2014, and the death of George Floyd in 2020, the country has seen riots triggered by incidents of police use of force. Since 1968, policing has changed in a number of respects, yet it remains the object of repeated calls for reform. In the meantime, the context has arguably changed less than policing has: racial inequalities with respect to income, wealth, housing, education, employment, and health all remain, and on some of those dimensions, the degree of inequality has hardly changed.[4]

We would not suggest that no room for improvements remains in how police services are organized, managed, and delivered, but it is worth considering how much the recurring unrest triggered by use-of-force incidents may be in part symptomatic of larger problems – that the "deeper cause" of 21st century unrest is the broader social

[1] National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968).

[2] Stephen Menendian, Richard Rothstein, and Nirali Beri, *The Road Not Taken: Housing and Criminal Justice 50 Years after the Kerner Commission Report* (Berkeley, CA: Othering & Belonging Institute, 2019), p. 13.

[3] National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *The Kerner Report* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 1. This book includes the original report.

[4] See Susan T. Gooden and Samuel L. Myers, "The Kerner Commission Report Fifty Years Later: Revisiting the American Dream," *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 4 (2018): 1-17; and Robert D. Putnam, *The Upswing: How America Came Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

and economic context of policing. Police "outputs" such as arrests, stops, searches, etc. – will inevitably reflect the context in which police operate. Insofar as crime and disorder are disproportionately concentrated in some segments of society, police-citizen contacts and their consequences will likewise be disproportionately concentrated in those same segments of society. To a significant degree, changes in police strategies, policies and practices cannot alter the effects of these larger social, economic, and political forces. Sadly, we have not seen the same consideration of context in the last year that the Kerner report offered in 1968.

Racial and Ethnic Disparities

Racial and ethnic disparities in enforcement outputs are the rule rather than the exception in American policing. The factors that give rise to these disparities are numerous, and their independent contributions to the disparities are difficult to estimate reliably. The recitals in the EO note that, "… urgent and immediate action is needed to eliminate racial inequities in policing, to modify and modernize policing strategies, policies, procedures, and practices, and to develop practices to better address the particular needs of communities of color to promote public safety, improve community engagement, and foster trust." Accordingly, we undertook analyses designed to assess racial and ethnic disparities in policing in Binghamton.

At our request, BPD provided data of several kinds for 2017 through 2019. We requested three years of data so that the findings of our analyses would not be distorted by any one unusual year; we did not include 2020 in our analyses on the assumption that the pandemic has made it a very unrepresentative year. We have analyzed data on calls for service, offenses, stops, arrests, and use of force. We address racial and ethnic disparities in personal safety, stops, arrests, and use of force.

Personal Safety

Crime and disorder are social problems endured disproportionately by Blacks and other people of color in the U.S. One analysis of data collected through the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) showed that, in 2018, Black persons were 41 percent more likely than White, non-Hispanic persons to have been the victim of a serious crime, and Hispanic persons were 20 percent more likely.[5] Effective strategies and programs to

[5] Rachel E. Morgan and Barbara Ouderkerk, *Criminal Victimization, 2018* (Washington: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2019), p. 19, table 20. Serious crime included completed rape or attempted rape, sexual assault with serious or minor injuries, completed forced sexual assault without injury, completed robbery, completed robbery without injury, attempted robbery with injury, attempted robbery without injury, completed aggravated assault with injury, attempted aggravated assault with a weapon, and threatened aggravated assault with a weapon.

reduce violence and other crimes may thus disproportionately benefit the marginalized communities in which crime is concentrated.

In Binghamton, relative to their share of the residential population, Blacks are overrepresented among the individual victims of many types of crime. We analyzed data on 10,106 offenses that involved one or more victims who were individuals identified as victims in police records, thereby excluding 5,733 offenses involving only other types of victims: businesses (as victims of, e.g., larceny or vandalism), religious organizations, government, public safety personnel, or society (as the victim of e.g., drug and traffic offenses). For each offense, we took account of the race and ethnicity of the victims identified in police records. All but a small fraction of offenses involved victims of the same race/ethnicity; multiple victims of mixed races or ethnicities were identified in only 1.8 percent of offenses.

Table 1 reports for each of a number of offense types the representation of each race/ethnicity among the victims. For example, 38 percent of the victims in aggravated assaults were Black, 46.7 percent were White, and 7.2 percent were Hispanic. The representation of each race among victims in each row can be directly compared to the proportion of the population that each race/ethnicity constitutes, shown in the shaded row. Thus, Black victims are overrepresented among the victims of aggravated assaults by a factor of more than three: 38 percent versus 11 percent of the population. To one

Table 1. Representation of Individual Victims' Race/Ethnicity by Offense Type, 2017-2019

	Victim Race/Ethnicity % (population %)				
Offense type (count)	Black (11.0%)	White (70.7%)	Hispanic (7.1%)	Other (11.1%)	Mixed*
Murder/manslaughter (17)	41.2%	35.3%	17.6%	0%	5.9%
Aggravated assault (516)	38.0%	46.7%	7.2%	3.7%	4.5%
Forcible rape (69)	21.7%	60.9%	11.6%	4.3%	1.4%
Robbery (220)	19.5%	60.5%	5.0%	12.7%	2.3%
Burglary (1,083)	17.5%	63.2%	3.4%	12.1%	3.9%
Larceny (3,139)	15.3%	73.1%	4.1%	6.5%	1.0%
Motor vehicle theft (113)	25.7%	56.6%	7.1%	10.6%	0%
Simple assault (1,667)	25.9%	63.6%	5.1%	3.1%	2.4%
Intimidation [harassment] (352)	25.0%	62.8%	5.4%	4.5%	2.3%
Criminal mischief (1,358)	19.4%	68.6%	3.5%	8.0%	0.5%
Other sex offenses (110)	17.3%	70.0%	8.2%	4.5%	0%
All offense types (10,106)	20.9%	65.8%	4.6%	7.0%	1.8%

Note: population race/ethnicity based on 2019 ACS estimates, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=binghamton,%20NY&tid=ACSDP5Y2019.DP05&hidePreview=false

* multiple victims of mixed race/ethnicity

degree or another, the same can be said of each offense category shown in the table, and for offenses against individual victims overall (shown in the bottom row). We find, then, a racial disparity in personal safety and security.

Table 2 breaks these patterns of victimization down spatially, by police beat (or post). The overrepresentation of Blacks among victims holds in every police beat.

Table 2. Victim Race/Ethnicity by Police Beat

	Victim Race/Ethnicity % (population %)				
Beat (offense count)	Black (11.0%)	White (70.7%)	Hispanic (7.1%)	Other (11.1%)	Mixed*
200 (1359)	285 21.0%	923 67.9%	45 3.3%	75 5.5%	31 2.3%
201 (1107)	212 19.2%	732 6.6%	54 4.9%	92 8.3%	17 1.5%
202 (1092)	175 16.0%	725 6.6%	46 4.2%	122 11.2%	24 2.2%
203 (929)	137 14.7%	711 76.5%	32 3.4%	38 4.1%	11 1.2%
204 (884)	194 21.9%	585 66.2%	47 5.3%	44 5.0%	14 1.6%
205 (841)	155 18.4%	593 70.5%	43 5.1%	37 4.4%	13 1.5%
206 (1304)	312 23.9%	833 63.9%	73 5.6%	64 4.9%	22 1.7%
207 (1637)	331 20.2%	1036 63.3%	78 4.8%	158 9.7%	34 2.1%
209 (892)	293 32.8%	475 53.3%	43 4.8%	70 7.8%	11 1.2%
Other (61)	14 23.0%	37 60.7%	1 1.6%	8 13.1%	1 1.6%
10106	2108 20.9%	6650 65.8%	452 4.5%	708 7.0%	178 1.8%

* multiple victims of mixed race/ethnicity

Stops

With the attention directed toward the application of drug courier profiles in highway traffic enforcement in the 1990s, and the ensuing nation-wide concern with racial profiling, countless analyses have been conducted to assess the use of racial profiling by state and local police agencies. A key feature of the better analyses of racial profiling is recognition of the distinction between racial disparity and racial bias, and the

implications of this distinction for analytical strategies. Disparities can arise for a host of reasons other than bias by police. Detecting *bias* – and not merely disparities – in police officers' decisions to stop motorists or pedestrians poses particularly difficult analytical challenges. The hypothetical population whose behavior would form legitimate grounds for a stop (violations of the law or actions that otherwise arouse reasonable, articulable suspicion) forms an ideal benchmark against which data on stops can be compared. This "violator" population cannot be readily estimated, however. This is the commonly described "benchmark" or "denominator" problem in analyses of racial profiling. Many attempts have been made to form benchmarks that approximate the racial and ethnic composition of the hypothetical violator population. The simplest and easiest approach to this problem is to compare those who are stopped to the residential population of the surrounding jurisdiction, but this approach suffers from many shortcomings. Tillyer, Engel, and Wooldredge observe that "While there is some consensus in the research community that residential census populations are the least reliable of the benchmarks available, there is no such consensus regarding the validity of other techniques."[6] We caution readers to exercise care in drawing inferences about police bias from the analyses that we are able to perform with BPD's data, because the benchmark that we can apply with the available data is not optimal.

Information on BPD stops was captured on form 710Z, and subsequently data-entered into BPD's law enforcement record management system (LERMS). Beginning in 2019, patrol units were able to enter information directly through their MCTs, but other units were not equipped to do so. In 2018-2019, some forms were mistakenly data-entered into a different table in the LERMS and could not be recovered for our analysis. For this and perhaps other reasons, the stop data that we can analyze are incomplete. Recorded stops stored in accessible digital form decreased from 4,116 in 2017 to 2,830 in 2018 and to 780 in 2019; counts of traffic stops in the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system, however, did not exhibit such a drop. Information about the reasons for stops and the reasons for searches were entered in free-text form, rather than through standardized drop-down menus, which limits our ability to make use of that information for analysis. Not all of the stop records could be successfully matched to CAD records using incident numbers to recover other information about the stops. Our analysis rests on 7,468 stops. Thus our analyses of the stop data will be subject to the caveat that the stop records are incomplete, and statistical controls insufficient, such that the analytic results must be interpreted with caution.

Table 3 summarizes the racial and ethnic composition of the people involved in stops. The representation of the different races/ethnicities does not vary appreciably by stop type: stops based on vehicle and traffic law violations (V&T), investigatory stops, and others. One-quarter of the stops were of Blacks, nearly two-thirds of Whites, and 5-

[6] Rob Tillyer, Robin S. Engel, and John Wooldredge, "The Intersection of Racial Profiling and the Law," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 36 (2008): 138-53, p. 143.

6 percent of Hispanics. Blacks are overrepresented in stops relative to their representation in the population, a disparity that could arise from police deployment patterns, driving behavior, or other factors, in addition to or instead of bias. In the absence of a suitable benchmark, any of these inferences from these data are plausible.

Table 3. Stops and Type of Stop by Race/Ethnicity

	Stop Type			
Citizen Race/Ethnicity	V&T	Investigatory	Other	Total
Black	1590 24.8%	241 27.6%	45 24.9%	1876 25.1%
White	4095 63.8%	551 63.2%	112 61.9%	4758 63.7%
Hispanic	322 5.0%	55 6.3%	10 5.5%	387 5.2%
Other	408 6.4%	25 2.9%	14 7.7%	447 6.0%
Total	6415	872	181	7468

Searches of persons and/or vehicles were conducted in 11.5 percent of the stops. See Table 4. The proportion of stops of persons of each race/ethnicity that involved a search varied somewhat, from 12.4 percent of Blacks, 11.5 percent of Whites, to 8.3 percent of Hispanics. Table 4 also shows the frequency with which searches yielded contraband, which was found in 14 percent of the stops in which a search was conducted, with some variation across categories of race/ethnicity.

Table 4. Searches by Race/Ethnicity.

Citizen Race/Ethnicity	Search Type						Contraband found
	None	Any	Consent	Probable Cause	Other	Unknown	
Black	1643	233 12.4%	39	46	5	143	34 14.6%
White	4210	548 11.5%	84	60	7	397	79 14.4%
Hispanic	345	42 10.9%	5	9	0	28	4 9.5%
Other	410	37 8.3%	1	9	0	27	4 10.8%
Total	6608	860 11.5%	129	124	12	595	121 14.1%

We performed a statistical analysis, using propensity score weighting, to test the hypothesis that a post-stop outcome – search, contraband, arrest, or ticket – was affected by the citizens' race.[7] The results indicate that none of these outcomes is affected by citizens' race.

We also analyzed the spatial distribution of stops across police beats. Counts of stops correlate fairly strongly with levels of crime. Investigatory stops correlate with person, property, and victimless crimes, with correlation coefficients of 0.75 to 0.94 (a perfect linear correlation is 1.0). Stops based on vehicle and traffic law violations also correlate with crime levels, albeit less strongly. These patterns likely reflect police deployment, with more resources allocated to higher-crime areas, and officer proactivity, with higher levels of officer-initiated enforcement activity where need and opportunity (i.e., suspicious behavior) is greater.

On balance, these results do not eliminate bias as an explanation for the racial disparity in stops, but several findings tend to discredit bias as an explanation: that search rates and other post-stop outcomes do not vary by race, and that the number of stops are strongly associated with crime levels.

Arrests

Research has shown that, in general, officers' decisions to make arrests are driven mainly by the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the evidence of wrong-doing, the preferences of a complainant, and the demeanor of the suspected offender. Findings about the effect of race have been mixed. One meta-analysis indicates that Blacks are more likely to be arrested, other things being equal, though the magnitude of the racial difference appears to be contingent on community and agency context.[8]

The second row of Table 5 shows the racial and ethnic composition of the people arrested by BPD officers between 2017 and 2019. More than one-third of arrestees were Black, 57 percent were White, and 7 percent were Hispanic.[9] In Binghamton, Blacks are overrepresented in arrests relative to their representation in the population, though no valid inference about bias can be drawn from that fact.

The remaining rows in Table 5 break down the arrests by the seriousness of the charges, the basis for the arrest (arrest "type"), whether the incident was initiated by a citizen or by police, and whether the arrest was custodial or involved the issuance of an appearance ticket. Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than non-Hispanic Whites to

[7] We statistically controlled for year, month, day of week, time of day, and stop type.

[8] National Research Council, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl (eds.). (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004). Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson, and Stephen D. Mastrofski, "Effect of Suspect Race on Officers' Arrest Decisions," *Criminology* 49 (2011): 473-512.

[9] An arrest on one or multiple charges is counted only once. Any individual arrestee could be counted multiple times based on multiple arrests in 2017-2019.

be arrested for felony offenses, and more likely to be detained. Whites were more likely to be arrested on bench warrants and less likely to be arrested based on complaints. Finally, arrests of Blacks were less likely than those of Whites to stem from an officer-initiated incident, i.e., at officers' discretion. These findings are consistent with a pattern that might be expected to hold when arrest decisions are not influenced by race or ethnicity. Without data on similarly situated incidents in which no arrests were made, however, any conclusion about racial or ethnic bias in arrests is quite tentative.

Table 5. Arrests by Arrestee Race/Ethnicity.

	Black	White	Hispanic	Other
All	34.4%	57.2%	6.8%	1.6%
Top charge level by race				
Felony	22.2%	10.8%	17.4%	11.1%
Misdemeanor	38.0%	44.2%	37.8%	44.7%
Violation	15.4%	12.1%	17.2%	20.1%
Other	24.4%	33.0%	27.6%	24.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Arrest type by race				
Complaint	36.8%	31.7%	37.6%	35.2%
Bench warrant	15.5%	20.9%	15.5%	12.1%
Other warrant/ court summons	17.4%	16.1%	16.7%	17.6%
Order of protection	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0%
Crime in progress	27.5%	28.6%	27.0%	32.7%
Other/unknown	1.4%	1.8%	1.6%	2.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Incident initiation				
Citizen-initiated (911, telephone)	67.3%	56.4%	63.9%	56.3%
Officer-initiated	22.7%	32.8%	25.0%	30.7%
Other/unknown	10.0%	10.8%	11.1%	13.1%
Arrest status				
Appearance ticket	30.2%	36.5%	32.6%	43.7%
Detained	55.0%	48.4%	52.3%	39.2%
Released on recognizance	0.3%	0.5%	0.1%	2.0%
Released to third party	4.0%	4.7%	3.7%	4.0%
Released on bail	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	1.5%
Other/unknown	10.0%	9.2%	10.7%	9.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Use of Force

To a substantial extent, the use of physical force by police is a response to the demands in their work environment, particularly the incidence with which citizens fail to comply with lawful police direction. Research on police use of force has generally found that the prevalence and severity of force is driven primarily by the nature and level of citizen resistance.[10] This is as it should be: force should be no greater than is required to overcome citizen resistance. Many police agencies' use of force policies have incorporated a use of force continuum, which specifies forms and levels of resistance and the corresponding forms of force that are proportional to the resistance. As we discuss below with regard to policies, the particulars of use of force continua – i.e., the placement of forms of force relative to levels of resistance and to one another – vary across agencies, and it appears that recently, use of force policies have deemphasized continua in favor of guidelines that take account of numerous factors that constitute the totality of circumstances that properly affect use of force judgments.

Even so, the concept of a continuum and the principle that force should be proportional to resistance remains useful. In assessing patterns of use of force, then, it is illuminating to juxtapose the level or severity of force used by police and the level of resistance that officers were required to overcome. Even though resistance is only part of the totality of the circumstances that officers should assess, police force relative to citizen resistance can be used to form a measure – the "force factor" – that facilitates a description of broad patterns.[11]

We briefly describe the 581 incidents in which force was used by Binghamton police against one or more citizens in 2017 - 2019. Table 6 summarizes the distributions of use-of-force incidents across the years, times of the day (BPD reliefs), and BPD posts (or beats). Table 6 also shows the types of the most serious offenses that police recorded in these incidents, the numbers of officers using force in the incidents, and the numbers of citizens against whom force was used.

[10] See, e.g., Joel H. Garner, Christopher D. Maxwell, and Cedrick Heraux, "Characteristics Associated with the Prevalence and Severity of Force Used by the Police," *Justice Quarterly* 19 (2002): 705-746; Geoffrey P. Alpert and Roger G. Dunham, *Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); William Terrill, "Police Use of Force: A Transactional Approach," *Justice Quarterly* 22 (2005): 107-138.

[11] Geoffrey P. Alpert and Roger G. Dunham, "The Force Factor: Measuring and Assessing Police Use of Force and Suspect Resistance," in *Use of Force By Police: Overview of National and Local Data* (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1999), pp. 45-60. https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/archives/ncjrs/176330-2.pdf. This simple measure is not useful in making judgments about the propriety of force in any individual incident, which requires attention to the wider totality of circumstances.

Table 6. Use-of-Force Incidents, 2017-2019.

Year	**Count**		**Post**	**Count**
2017	181		200	71
2018	185		201	51
2019	215		202	47
			203	50
Offense type			204	35
Part I violent	39		205	39
Part I property	34		206	67
Weapons	11		207	129
Other violent	83		208	4
Drugs	41		209	45
Other	373		Other/unspecified	43
Number of citizens			**Number of officers**	
1	525		1	142
2	36		2	234
3	10		3	119
4-7	10		4	43
			5	19
Relief			6	10
1 (10:45 p.m.-6:45 a.m.)	211		7-11	14
2 (6:45 a.m.-2:45 p.m.)	109			
3 (2:45 p.m.-10:45 p.m.)	260			
unknown	1			

Binghamton police used force against 679 citizens in the 581 incidents. Table 7, below, summarizes the characteristics of those citizens, and the forms of impairment (if any) that police officers perceived. Nearly half were young adults (i.e., ages 19 to 30). Three-quarters were men. The numbers of Whites and Blacks are nearly equal. Nearly one-third were impaired by alcohol.

Table 8, below, summarizes the forms of resistance that the citizens reportedly posed to police. Multiple forms of resistance could be recorded. Thus we include on the rows for each form of resistance both the total count of persons who resisted (in the column marked "any") and, in the far right column, the number for whom that form of resistance was the highest. The latter number turns on the assumption that the degree or level of resistance declines as one descends the list (i.e., assaultive resistance is the highest level, the possession of a weapon the next highest, and so forth through to passive resistance, the lowest level).

Table 7. Citizens Against Whom Police Used Force, 2017-2019.

Age	**Count**	**Race/ethnicity**	**Count**
Under 16	43	White	305
16-18	71	Black	342
19-21	102	Hispanic	20
22-26	128	Other/unknown	12
27-30	94		
31-40	130	**Impairment**	
41-83	108	Alcohol	215
unknown	3	Drugs	80
		Mental disorder	12
Sex		Other	14
Male	508		
Female	171		

Table 8. Forms of Citizen Resistance in Use of Force Incidents

Resistance	**Any**	**Highest**
Assaultive resistance	105	105
Weapon	80	68
Flight	163	122
Physical resistance	476	293
Passive resistance	183	76

BPD subject resistance reports capture information on several forms of force that officers may use: various forms of physical force (e.g., weaponless control techniques, open- or closed-hand strikes, take-downs); the display and/or discharge of a conducted energy weapon (Taser); the use of pepper spray; deployment of a canine; display, pointing and/or discharge of a firearm. Beginning in 2018, BPD records of use of force distinguished three levels of force. As described in BPD's use of force policy, level 1 force includes the application of weaponless defensive techniques (including control holds and those applied to vulnerable areas), brandishing a weapon (pepper spray, Taser, baton, or firearm) or pointing a firearm, and firearm discharges to euthanize injured animals. Thus, BPD policy provides for a fairly low (and thus inclusive) threshold at which force is reportable. Level 2 force includes the application of a chemical agent, the use (deployment) of a Taser, the use of an impact weapon, the use of weaponless defensive techniques other than control holds (such as strikes, kicks, and take-downs), the release of a canine, and any use of force that results in an injury. Level 3 force includes deadly force: firearm discharge (other than discharges at animals), impact

weapon strikes to the head or neck, any neck restraint, choke hold, or carotid control hold, and any force that results in death or serious injury, or creates a substantial risk of causing death. During the years analyzed here, BPD officers did not record a use of level 3 force. Table 9 displays the frequency with which officers reportedly used the various forms and levels of force each year. Table 10 displays a breakdown of each form of force by the level of force that it represented. Note that Tasers may be only drawn and not deployed; firearms were only pointed and not discharged.

We note that physical force is a category that encompasses many types of force; the subject resistance report form does not capture more specific information about physical force in a standardized way. Hence the data do not support more detailed analysis without additional effort to manually classify the narrative or textual descriptions in the reports, which exceeded the scope of our inquiry.

Table 9. Frequency of Forms of Force by Year, 2017-2019

Form/level	2017	2018	2019	Total
Physical	167	170	207	544
Taser	18	12	19	49
Pepper spray	1	2	3	6
Canine	3	1	0	4
Firearm	38	42	64	144
Other	37	50	72	159
Level 1	NA	142	197	339
Level 2	NA	67	70	137

Table 10. Frequency of Forms of Force by Level of Force (2018-2019 only)

Form	Level 1	Level 2	Total
Physical	245	132	377
Taser	23	8	31
Pepper spray	0	5	5
Canine	0	1	1
Firearm	102	4	106
Other	111	11	122
Total	339	137	476

The proper use of force by police should, in general, be proportional to the forms and levels of resistance that officers must overcome in order to manage the encounters and ensure the safety of citizens and themselves. BPD subject resistance reports capture information on several forms of resistance: passive resistance (such as ignoring an officer's directions or commands); physical resistance (such as attempting to elude an

officer's grasp); flight; the possession of a weapon (such as a firearm or knife); and assaultive resistance. Citizens can engage in multiple forms of resistance in any one incident. We classified the citizens' resistance in terms of the highest level, assuming that levels of resistance increase as one moves from left to right across the columns in Table 11 (as we did the rows in Table 8, above). For each form of resistance, Table 11 summarizes the frequencies with which officers used different forms and levels of force, given the level of resistance. Bearing in mind that only pointing a firearm is a low level of force that is proper in high-risk situations, we do not detect evidence of a general pattern of disproportionate force.

Table 11. Forms and Levels of Force by Levels of Resistance

	Resistance					
Form/level	None	Passive	Physical	Flight	Weapon	Assaultive
2017-2019						
Physical	4	27	288	89	38	98
Taser	0	11	7	11	12	8
Pepper spray	0	0	5	0	0	1
Canine	0	0	0	2	2	0
Firearm	12	47	5	39	34	7
2018-2019						
Level 1	15	53	147	49	39	36
Level 2	0	3	53	31	11	39

To place the number of use-of-force incidents in perspective, it is common to consider the frequency with which force is used relative to the number of custodial arrests that police make. BPD made 8,014 custodial arrests in 2017-2019, 7,739 of which were not in connection with a use-of-force incident. Relative to their representation among arrestees who were not involved in a use-of-force incident, Blacks are overrepresented among the citizens against whom force was used; see Table 12. Racial differences in the likelihood of resistance, which could partially or wholly account for this disparity in use of force, are theoretically plausible but beyond the scope of this analysis.[12]

[12] Such differences could, theoretically, arise from differences in police legitimacy and a sense of obligation to comply. This relationship was empirically confirmed in an analysis of the SSO data collected previously in Schenectady; see Robert E. Worden and Hannah Cochran, "Incivility in Police-Citizen Encounters," unpublished working paper (Albany, NY: The John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2020).

Table 12. Race/Ethnicity in Custodial Arrests and Use of Force Incidents

	Arrestees not in force incident	Citizens against whom force used
% Black	35.9	50.4
% White	55.8	44.9
% Hispanic	6.9	2.9
% other race	1.4	1.8

Table 13 displays for each racial/ethnic category the fraction of citizens who were subject to the various forms of force, overall and for each level of resistance. The detection of racial/ethnic disparities turns on comparisons of the percentages across the rows – e.g., the proportion of citizens in each racial/ethnic category to whom a form of force was applied, given that their level of resistance was similar. Many such comparisons can be made, though the small numbers of citizens who are neither Black nor White caution against strong inferences about patterns involving Hispanics or those of another race; our attention therefore concentrates on differences between Blacks and Whites.

Two disparities stand out. First, officers were somewhat more likely to draw a Taser when the citizen was Black, even when the level of resistance is held constant. Second, officers were more likely to point a firearm at Whites who possessed a weapon. Whether these simple disparities are indicative of bias cannot be determined based on only this analysis, a question that we revisit below, with statistical controls for other factors.

Table 14 replicates for levels of force the kind of analysis of forms of force presented in Table 13, to examine racial/ethnic disparities holding levels of resistance constant. Level 2 force was somewhat more likely to be used against Blacks than Whites, overall and at each of most levels of resistance.

Table 13. Forms of Force by Citizen Race/Ethnicity by Highest Level of Resistance

	Black	White	Hispanic	Other
	N=342	N=305	N=20	N=12
Physical force overall	78.9%	81.0	75.0	100
Taser overall	9.6%	4.9	5.0	0
Pepper spray overall	1.5%	0.3	0	0
Firearm overall	22.8%	20.3	20.0	0
Canine overall	0.6%	0.7	0	0
Assaultive resistance	N=54	N=46	N=2	N=3
Physical force	92.6%	95.7	50.0	100
Taser	11.1%	4.3	0	0
Pepper spray	0%	2.2	0	0
Firearm	5.6%	6.5	50.0	0
Canine	0%	0	0	0
Weapon	N=36	N=29	N=3	N=0
Physical force	69.4%	37.9	66.7	NA
Taser	22.2%	10.3	33.3	NA
Pepper spray	0%	0	0	NA
Firearm	41.7%	65.5	0	NA
Canine	0%	6.9	0	NA
Flight	N=68	N=50	N=3	N=1
Physical force	76.5%	68.0	66.7	100
Taser	11.8%	6.0	0	0
Pepper spray	0%	0	0	0
Firearm	32.4%	32.0	33.3	0
Canine	2.9%	0	0	0
Physical resistance	N=136	N=140	N=9	N=8
Physical force	97.8%	98.6	100	100
Taser	2.2%	2.9	0	0
Pepper spray	3.7%	0	0	0
Firearm	2.2%	1.4	0	0
Canine	0%	0	0	0
Passive resistance	N=39	N=35	N=2	N=0
Physical force	23.1%	48.6	50.0	NA
Taser	20.5%	8.6	0	NA
Pepper spray	0%	0	0	NA
Firearm	66.7%	57.1	50.0	NA
Canine	0%	0	0	NA

Table 14. Levels of Force by Citizen Race/Ethnicity by Highest Level of Resistance

	Black	White	Hispanic	Other
Level of force	N=241	N=206	N=17	N=12
Level 1 force overall	67.2	76.2	64.7	75.0
Level 2 force overall	32.8	23.8	35.3	25.0
Assaultive resistance	N=39	N=32	N=1	N=3
Level 1 force	38.5	59.4	0	66.7
Level 2 force	61.5	40.6	100	33.3
Weapon	N=24	N=24	N=2	N=0
Level 1 force	79.2	79.2	50.0	NA
Level 2 force	20.8	20.8	50.0	NA
Flight	N=46	N=30	N=3	N=1
Level 1 force	56.5	70.0	66.7	0
Level 2 force	43.5	30.0	33.3	100
Physical resistance	N=100	N=84	N=8	N=8
Level 1 force	72.0	75.0	62.5	87.5
Level 2 force	28.0	25.0	37.5	12.5
Passive resistance	N=23	N=31	N=2	N=0
Level 1 force	91.3	96.8	100	NA
Level 2 force	8.7	3.2	0	NA

Resistance is an important factor to take into account in assessing disparities in the use of force, but it is not the only factor. We therefore conduct regression analyses of forms and levels of force to estimate the differences between White citizens, whom we treat as a baseline or reference point, and Black and Hispanic citizens, respectively. In addition to levels of resistance, we statistically control for other factors that might affect officers' use of force, including the citizen's impairment (due to alcohol or drugs), the citizen's characteristics (sex, age, and size), and the seriousness of the offense.

Table 15 summarizes the results. The numerical entries are estimated odds ratios associated with each factor. A ratio of 1.0 represents even odds or risk of a form (or level 2) of force being used given a one unit increase in the factor. Since most of the factors are binary (e.g., the citizen was male or female, or the citizen passively resisted or not), the odds ratio represents the odds of a form or level of force being used when that factor holds. An odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicates that the factor increases the likelihood that the form or level of force was used, and an odds ratio less than 1.0 indicates that the factors decreases the likelihood of force.

A ratio of 1.0 also represents the "null hypothesis" of no difference. By the logic of null hypothesis significance testing, we estimate the 95 percent confidence interval around the point estimate of the risk ratio, and we reject the null hypothesis of no difference when the confidence interval does not include 1.0. Then we may say that the difference is "statistically significant" – that is, a difference of such magnitude that it is

likely to occur by chance less than one in twenty times.[13] Table 15 marks such differences with an asterisk (*). The proposition that police use of force is biased against Blacks would be confirmed with evidence that the odds ratio associated with the citizen being Black is significantly greater than 1.0.

Table 15. Logistic Regression Analyses of Forms of Force

	Physical	Taser	Firearm	Force Level
Assaultive resistance	3.67	3.62*	0.24	3.12*
Weapon	0.12*	4.04*	10.00*	0.97
Flight	0.79	1.48	3.05*	2.13*
Physical resistance	149.48*	0.40	0.01*	4.61*
Passive resistance	0.54	2.56*	3.66*	0.62
Male	0.75	2.79	1.86	3.38*
Age	1.01	1.04*	1.00	0.97*
Alcohol impairment	1.40	0.51	0.30*	1.62
Drug impairment	1.84	0.53	6.48*	0.53
Height (inches)	1.06	1.05	1.00	1.00
Weight (pounds)	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00
Black	0.77	2.55*	1.31	1.12
Hispanic	1.77	1.66	0.21	1.58
Other race	-	-	-	0.66
Part I violent	0.23*	2.40	12.25*	0.26*
Part I property	1.36	0.85	0.54	1.09
Weapon offense	17.86*	0.51	0.13	0.52
Other violent	1.85	1.33	1.11	0.70
Drugs	2.49	0.38	0.89	1.83
Constant	0.11	0.00	0.18	0.06

As expected, citizen resistance is associated with use of force. The use of a Taser is more than 3.5 times more likely when the citizen is assaultive. Officers were 4 times more likely to use a Taser and 10 times more likely to draw and point a firearm when the citizen had a weapon. Physical force is nearly 150 times more likely when the citizen resists physically.

Other factors also affect use of force. Officers are more likely to use level 2 force on a man than on a woman, and less likely to use level 2 force on an older person. They are more than 12 times more likely to point a firearm when the offense is a serious (Part I) violent crime.

[13] The same logic is applied when different analytic strategies are applied and the statistic in question is a regression coefficient: we reject the null hypothesis of no bias when the statistic is sufficiently reliable that we can say with confidence that it is different from zero. Then we can appropriately consider the magnitude of the estimated effect or difference.

Finally, and of central importance in assessing racial or ethnic bias, these results reveal one disparity that is not accounted for by other factors: officers were 2.5 times more likely to draw a Taser when the citizen was Black. The other odds ratios associated with Black citizens were within a 95 percent confidence interval of 1.0 – i.e., not statistically significant – and none of the odds ratios associated with Hispanic citizens were statistically significant.

We find evidence of one racial/ethnic disparity in the use of force that is not accounted for by other factors that constitute the totality of the circumstances in police-citizen interactions, and which we can include in the analysis. BPD officers were more likely to draw a Taser in responding to the resistance of Blacks, relative to Whites. It may be that this disparity is attributable to other factors for which this analysis could not account; further scrutiny of this pattern is warranted.

We believe that these findings illustrate the value of analyzing officers' use of force in this way. With this one exception, the use of force by BPD officers appears to be racially unbiased; this exception is a subject for administrative attention. We also believe that, for the purposes of describing and assessing patterns in police use of force, a subject resistance report form that prompts officers to check off the use of specific types of force would be advantageous, to which we return below.

Community Input

The City convened a series of six group-specific community meetings conducted over Zoom between January 26, 2021, and February 18, 2021. Each week, representatives of various groups, programs, or neighborhoods within the Binghamton community convened to share their views on police and policing in the City. These individuals represented faith organizations, neighborhood groups, community advocacy groups, local businesses, and education and youth groups. Participants presented their perspectives on policing and local prioritization of expenditures in Binghamton, and testimonies often included personal accounts of experiences with the police or the experiences of their constituencies, clientele, or other interested parties. The meetings were moderated by Megan Brocket, Assistant to the Mayor for Neighborhood and Youth Affairs. These meetings did not allow for "Q & A" or cross-discussion among participants or the moderator, and were instead conducted as "listening sessions." Meetings lasted 35 minutes to an hour, and the number of participants and attendees ranged from 52 to 105.

Themes that exemplify public perspectives were distilled from transcriptions of community meetings conducted over Zoom, and reinforced by testimony submitted in written form. We assigned codes to phrases or pieces of testimony that were thematically cohesive, examining these elements across and within meeting groups, with a view toward articulating public perspectives and recommendations on how the City of Binghamton should pursue police reform. We summarize the community input here,

without substantive judgment or comment on the merits of the proposals and recommendations.

Building Trust

Transparency and Accountability

One of the most outward hopes expressed by participants in community forums was to come away from the current reform process with a definitive and comprehensive understanding of Binghamton's policing challenges, both for the department and the community. On behalf of the interests of traditionally underserved citizens and minority groups, many community members vocalized a strong desire for the collaborative to effect changes in the Binghamton Police Department that would increase the department's transparency and accountability. Public emphasis on transparency focused on internal department processes and activities in the field. The community outlined recommendations to enhance existing processes and offered suggestions for new systems.

The mechanisms by which citizens hold police accountable were a central focus. Several strategies for improving the existing complaint system were put forth, including that this process should be made easy to locate on the department's website, and further, that it be serviceable, uncomplicated, and that information or instruction pertaining to this process be conspicuous and explicit. Further, the public requested that BPD regularly provide complaint data on its website, such as the number and nature of complaints, especially complaints that relate to behaviors potentially indicative of racial bias, so that trends and patterns in such practices can be identified externally. Among survey respondents, more than half reported that they were unsure or did not know how to file a complaint against a member of the BPD, were the need to arise.

Further underlining this desire for external review of police activity, the public called for the formation of a Citizen Review Board. Participants noted several responsibilities this Board would ideally fulfill, including the investigation of complaints, as well as investigation of officers exhibiting problematic behavior that has not yet risen to the level of a formal complaint. Participants highlighted the importance for careful consideration of who would be chosen to serve on the Citizen Review Board, with emphasis on delegates who were both qualified and representative of a diverse set of viewpoints. The majority of survey respondents reflected some skepticism about the thoroughness with which BPD investigates complaints about its officers, and about a third of respondents perceived that any punishment resulting from a substantiated complaint would be "very lenient."

Calls for transparency as a vehicle for accountability centered on data more generally. Specifically, the community called for a full and comprehensive review of Binghamton Police Department's activities, and for the department to disseminate

recurring reports detailing, for instance: police trends pertaining to stops, arrests, and uses of force; or a "report card" detailing racial and ethnic characteristics of the populations with whom the police make contact in stops and arrests. Participants further requested that an independent and external body analyze data on police activity, and that respective reports be made accessible to all members of the public. Public input also highlighted the desire for BPD to make historical and contemporary annual reports available online. Community members also noted that it is not enough to simply post this information to the department's website, and called for BPD to utilize broad-based avenues for disseminating information to reach a wide and diverse audience (e.g., those who do not have internet access). Slightly less than half of survey respondents reported that making such data available would reduce bias and improve police-community relations, and about 50% reported that such information sharing would improve trust.

Through public input, the community indicated a desire for greater transparency concerning individual officer's personnel records. The elimination of Section 50-a allows for police disciplinary records to be made public, and public comment included a desire to see the department direct attention toward conforming to directives that result from 50-a. Many members of the public also expressed general support for both dashcam and Body-Worn Camera (BWC) technologies, and called on BPD to introduce a more comprehensive BWC policy, specifying amendments that would mandate recording of all interactions with citizens without exception.

Public Input and Involvement

A desired outcome repeated by many participants was for improved relationships between police and citizens, and the community expressed a hope that this collaborative might serve to foster respect for one another. It was noted by some that, for this to be achieved, the police and community would have to make concerted efforts to build more interpersonal relationships with one another. A majority of respondents to the survey indicated that convening police-community forums regularly would help improve police-community relations, about half believed it would improve levels of trust, and about a third reported that such meetings would help reduce bias and disparity. Community members especially emphasized a desire for greater positive engagement between BPD and Binghamton youth, and more than half of respondents perceived that such engagement held the potential for improving relations and trust, and a little less than half thought such interactions would reduce bias. While there is room for improvement, community members did express appreciation for local law enforcement agencies' willingness to provide access to student groups in the service of nurturing community engagement and youth interaction.

Further, participants called for the department to acknowledge the harms done by policing in America throughout history, indicating both the symbolic and substantive

significance of such a gesture, even if these harms were not directly contributed to by current Binghamton Police Department officers. Such a reckoning, the public posited, might spark a healing process between groups historically at odds with one another. Some community suggestions for these acknowledgements were characterized by an expansive mandate, and included, e.g., "[for] the United Nations… to… classify the mistreatment of Black people in the U.S. by the police as a human rights violation…and impose sanctions as necessary."

Another aspiration expressed by participants is for groups who presently exhibit low levels of trust and higher levels of fear towards the police to become more confident in BPD's commitment and capacity to protect them from harm. These groups include, but are not limited to: victims of domestic violence, LGBTQA youth, undocumented people, and ethnic and racial minorities.

Some participants noted that this collaborative was the first invitation they had received to provide input to police, and expressed a desire for the continuance of such channels for public input going forward. Just over half of survey responses reflected some level of disagreement that the department makes it easy for community members to provide input. In order for such dialogue to be maintained and encouraged, the community observed that current conduits for community input needed to be expanded. For example, participants noted that one way the department could field more community input was through collaboration with local educational institutions (e.g., Binghamton University could administer student surveys querying perceptions of policing within Binghamton schools).

Community input also included calls to provide the public with training on some of the same topics offered to BPD personnel. For example, training offered to the public *and* BPD on diversity or implicit bias would bolster a holistic and shared understanding. Further, instructing the community about the department's operations, such as the hiring procedures and use of the civil service test, could serve to stimulate future conversations about reform. Outreach programs designed to educate the wider community about local mental health and substance abuse problems, as well as provide information about the services already available to the public, such as the Mental Health Association of the Southern Tier (a private organization focused on crisis intervention, which is equipped with their own emergency phone number and sometimes partners with local police in responses to mental health calls), might serve to enrich the quality of discussions the public can have about areas in need of reform. Further, transparency concerning the nature and frequency of police trainings, such as those in implicit bias, diversity, mental health, and de-escalation, may heighten the community's knowledge of police competencies and capacities. There were also recommendations for disseminating a broader set of instructions on "how to interact with the police," to both populations unfamiliar with American policing such as undocumented individuals, as well as for wider audiences.

Internal Structures

Training

Over the course of meetings convened for public testimony, the community called for a wide range of trainings to be offered to or mandated for officers. These recommendations spanned a broad base of concerns related to interactions with culturally and racially diverse individuals and communities, though most directly center on enhancing officer education in, and awareness of, implicit bias. Community members also highlighted the imperative for the department to engage in anti-racism training, cultural diversity and diversity awareness training, cultural competency training (including those that emphasize a focus on cultural linguistics), as well as educational programs for officers to learn more broadly about the historical and contemporary implications for structural racism in American society. Roughly 50% of survey respondents reported that anti-bias, diversity and inclusion training would help to reduce bias and disparity, improve police-community relations, and improve trust.

Community members also called for officers to be trained in non-violent intervention and de-escalation and training in navigating domestic abuse, mental health, and substance abuse calls. More than half of survey respondents reported that de-escalation training and training for officers in mental health situations would help improve police-community relations, and roughly 50% reported that these trainings would improve levels of trust. Local community groups also offered their own services to meet these ends, citing their particular expertise and local knowledge. Public input included the recommendation that police training be coordinated with local service providers, and that such a cohesion might enhance police competency for specific call types. For example, a local domestic violence services organization proposed that such a partnership would educate officers about accessing and tracking protective orders. Community perspectives also reflected a concern that current training for BPD officers overly emphasizes the use of deadly force. Participants worried that this emphasis might cause officers to overestimate the frequency with which force is appropriate. Shifting training priority to de-escalation and other tactics for defusing potentially dangerous situations might better prepare officers for the situations they encounter, and ensure the safety of both officers and citizens. Participants in community conversations also noted the potential benefits of comprehensive empathy training, acknowledging the numerous stressors that might affect an officer's ability to relate to the public, and the great importance of them doing so.

These trainings were suggested in the context of both educating incoming officers in the academy and as part of ongoing in-service training. Participants offered that some material could not be covered in short blocks by BPD, and also suggested that refresher training be provided. Within the training context, one recommendation

included extending the Field Training Officer (FTO) and probationary period for new officers. Community members would like to see younger officers benefit from their more senior counter-parts' experience and see value in fostering mentor-mentee relationships. Community members expressed appreciation and admiration for the ways in which older and more experienced officers handled calls, and suggested that younger officers might benefit from more opportunities to learn from them.

Hiring and Employment

A clear concern articulated among community members was that the department did not reflect the racial diversity of the community it policed. Taking steps to ensure that the demographics of members of the department are reflective of those within the city might engender more understanding, empathy, and trust on both sides. Roughly 50% of survey participants believed that increasing the department's diversity would serve to reduce bias and disparity, improve police-community relations, and improve trust. Further, some expressed the worry that without proper representation or efforts to change the culture of the department, young people in the city would not find a career in policing attractive.

Community members made several recommendations related to the hiring procedures at the department, including reviewing the standards for hire at BPD, reworking criteria of eligibility as necessary, and expanding and augmenting background checks on officers hired from other departments. For example, the public recommended that the department not allow an applicant to waive required credit from a regionally accredited college for those who have at least two years of active military service. The community further noted that officers whose histories included improper use of deadly force should be prohibited from recertification or re-entry to the force.

In concert with the community's desire for the department to be more deliberate in employing a force representative of the racial and ethnic populations that serve, the community also shared concerns about the department's posture regarding the mandate for officers to live inside of the city limits, specifically drawing attention to the high percentage of officers granted waivers to the mandate. Participants noted more stringent enforcement of the mandate that officers live within city limits would establish mechanisms through which officers could "get to know" the community on a more personal level, and potentially encourage more young locals to consider a job in law enforcement. Over half of survey participants reported some level of agreement that police officers should live within the City of Binghamton, though just under 50% also agreed that such a requirement might have an adverse impact on the size and quality of the applicant pool.

Policies

The public placed emphasis on their call for a reduction in, or elimination of, racial disparities in police enforcement actions or contact, and asked for assurance that no officers would engage in racial profiling. While the policy changes suggested by community members span a broad range of topics, the central concern was clearly that of disparities in treatment and enforcement of different racial groups. This perspective is supported by the majority of survey respondents who believe that police treat people of color less fairly than White people.

Racial profiling policies

Participants in the conversation noted that the Binghamton Police Department should strengthen existing policies that prohibit bias-based policing and introduce clear consequences for failure to abide by policy. Specifically, community members called for punitive measures to be the automatic result of police action deemed to be solely based on race (i.e., profiling, harassment, or enforcement actions). Further, participants expressed a desire to see BPD hold officers accountable for engaging in bias-based behavior in their private life. Participants expressed concerns that some members of the department participated in, and expressed support for, groups or ideals permissive of racially biased perspectives, or supportive of racist viewpoints.

Community members also noted the inequity in punishment that is conveyed by fees associated with records requests for, e.g., an accident report. Therefore, a policy that permits waiving these fees would establish more parity in enforcement outcomes among groups of varying economic disadvantage.

Use of force policies

Community members also called upon BPD leadership to review and revise its use of force policies. The public specifically recommended, for example, that the department implement more limitations on officers' ability to use force on minors, and expand the use of force continuum to allow for more incremental and measured responses to resistance (i.e., expanding from the current three levels to six). Other recommendations included prohibiting the use of choke or neck holds, any use of force that restricts an individual's airway, prohibiting use of force as a response to an individual's attitude or attempts to flee, and requiring officers to evaluate the cause of an individual's resistance prior to using force (such as medical, psychological, or cultural reasons). Prohibition of and certain consequences for using deadly force on unarmed or non-resistant people was repeatedly and urgently called for by the public. Further, some community members expressed frustration and the belief that official use of force policies posted on the department's website did not align with statements issued about the department's use of force policy by local leaders.

Response to Mental Health and Substance Abuse

Participants in the public forums called for the department to shift their enforcement priorities, specifically reducing enforcement emphasis for substance abuse and low-level drug offenses. Some recommended the BPD be prohibited by policy from making arrests for syringe possession and instead be required to divert individuals to social services for aid. Additionally, officers should be prohibited from accompanying individuals who had just been administered Narcan to the hospital.

The community also expressed strong support for policy change around mental health response. The recommendations stem largely from a desire to de-escalate interactions and secure individuals needed services, though participants shared mixed views about when police involvement in such calls should terminate during the encounter. While community members acknowledged BPD's successes in resolving calls for people in mental health crises peaceably and respectfully, some were concerned about further police involvement beyond this point. Participants vocalized a desire for creating alternatives to a police response by diverting these calls to external agencies whose members met specific qualifications and possessed specialized training. Community members also emphasized the potential benefits of having an unarmed crisis response team, thus preventing the escalation of violence in mental health calls. Such a crisis response service could be equipped with its own non-emergency phone line, and could be fully staffed by social workers or a "citizen response team". Participants also noted that such an alternative is acutely needed for those calling about children in mental health crises. Perspectives were mixed on whether this response should be partnered with law enforcement or unaccompanied by police. Some community members noted that the department could constrain the duties of a small body of officers to the purview of mental health crisis response. However, others were wary of any police involvement in such responses.

Enforcement Policies

Participants in the public forum presented a number of measures to redress enforcement policy. The recommendations put forth included banning no-knock warrants as a standard practice. Public input also included recommendations that the department amend its search policies; specifically, community members expressed a desire that policy mandates officers to instruct citizens on how to submit a complaint after a search is conducted, and that BPD review its policies around consent with respect to searches. Additionally, community members recommended that the department cease all surveillance activities that do not pertain to on-going investigations.

Members of the community likewise voiced concerns that there was lack of clarity regarding BPD's immigration enforcement policies, and participants wanted assurance that local enforcement would not engage in joint enforcement efforts with federal

agencies unless compelled by law. Related to this concern was a desire for police to be educated in immigration enforcement systems so that they are better equipped to protect undocumented people from targeted enforcement efforts by agencies like ICE, such as a training session on the difference between administrative and judicial warrants.

Officer competency

Public input drew attention to several areas of officer expertise that the community perceived to leave room for improvement. Members of the public stressed the potential benefits of police collaboration with social services such as domestic violence programs, who could work with the department to educate officers in the latest accepted practices and innovative strategies for responding to domestic violence calls. Participants emphasized the need for officers to be knowledgeable and aware of current state-wide domestic violence policies, for example: notifying officers that victims of domestic abuse can report DV crimes in any jurisdiction.

Participants likewise requested that BPD enact a policy establishing clear rules for interacting with transgender people, noting that this policy could be modeled after the one recently put into place in Syracuse, NY. Specifically, such a policy would require officers to use individuals' preferred pronouns, respect individuals' gender identities, and provide guidance for officers on how to write reports involving transgender individuals, as well as how to enact searches, transport, and interrogate transgender people. Further, the community desired a policy that would prohibit targeted enforcement of transgender people, or enforcement based solely on an individual's gender identity.

Enforcement Strategies

Public input provided perspectives on a host of enforcement strategies and tactics currently utilized by the Binghamton Police. Among the strongest concerns was for the department to offload the responsibility of responding to mental health, substance abuse, and other nonviolent calls to external agencies. In decoupling these responsibilities from police purview, the public offered, there could be reductions in the potential for escalation, reduced contact with the police that these populations experience, and elevated diversion to social services. Over half of survey respondents reported that enhancing police partnerships with social service agencies would improve police-community relations, and roughly 50% reported that it would improve trust. Further, many community members expressed frustrations about the department's enforcement strategies employed in large gathering settings, specifically citing police presence during the protests that occurred over the summer of 2020. There was a shared perception that enforcement was unnecessarily militarized at certain events, and

that this kind of deportment only served to stoke anxiety and heighten distrust. Community members also recommended that the department consider innovative strategies to reduce enforcement in a broader sense, citing a current effort in Berkeley, CA, to detach many traffic enforcement responsibilities from police and install independent, separate, traffic enforcement agencies, equipped with unarmed personnel.

Community perspective also reflected strong desires for a reduction in crime, and assurances that their community was a safe and healthy community. Many expressed appreciation for the services the department had provided them in a number of crime-control and investigative contexts. Emblematic of these overarching goals, participants expressed a hope that future generations would be able to look back on their youth in Binghamton as fondly as older generations currently are.

Community Policing

Some participants noted that implementing some form of a community policing model might be beneficial to the city, and others presented this viewpoint without expressly using the term "community policing." Participants in the community conversation made direct references to the potential benefit of implementing a 21st Century Policing model, which explicitly highlights the role that community policing and procedural justice training can play in reform. Public input also specifically highlighted calls for a return to more locally-focused beat policing and foot patrol, wherein individuals are able to become personally familiar with the officer assigned to their locale. Community meetings chronicled previous community partnerships in which the department had participated, emphasizing both the potential utility of returning to these alliances, and the eagerness of community organizations to collaborate. Desired partnerships included those that utilized local clergy members in responses to certain call types, and coordination with a victim's advocate or domestic violence specialist. Here again, the public underlined the potential benefit for police partnership with a mental health specialist, organization, or crisis response team. This is supported by the nearly 50% of survey respondents who reported that their community is willing to participate in community policing partnerships. Roughly 40% of respondents reported that they did not know if a BPD officer would be interested in engaging in community policing, and respondents were split fairly evenly about whether engaging in community policing would require more resources directed towards the department.

Beyond these potential coalitions, the community delineated several programs that served to foster personal bonds and trust between the community and police, cultivating community responsibility, and specifically helping to create ties between Binghamton youth and the Binghamton Police Department. Among these programs are the Citizen Police Academy, recurring events such as "Lunch with the Law," and police participation in local basketball leagues and youth groups. Community members also

noted the significance of police attendance at local events such as Black History Month gatherings at local institutions. Participants detailed the potential utility of revitalizing programs that embody the community policing model, such as the "Weed and Seed" program, and the Binghamton Neighborhood Engagement Team, or B-NET. Public input presented differing perspectives on School Resource Officers (SROs) in the Binghamton school system. Some expressed appreciation for the SRO program, some citing their positive influence on kids resulting from personal connections forged in non-enforcement contexts, while others presented the argument that SROs should no longer be selected from among Binghamton Police Department officers.

Prioritization

Threaded through the public discussions regarding shifts in enforcement objectives, many in the community expressed a conviction that there is an improper and unbalanced prioritization of city funds, and that diverting funds from law enforcement institutions to social services might better serve to improve the overall health and safety of the community. Some participants noted their belief that opportunities and programs available to people in jail were greater in number and more accessible than those that existed within the community; further, diverting funds to build and grow these programs might address some foundational issues in order to prevent the need for calling the police altogether.

Reallocating and Diverting Funds

Public input stressed a desire for reallocating funds from the police budget or securing additional funds to direct toward social services. Participants in the community meetings noted that programs that aid people regarding mental health, substance abuse and addiction, and housing were underfunded and overstretched. Diverting city funds to such areas would potentially have more beneficial impacts on the community than funds directed towards enforcement. While slightly less than half of survey respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that the department would need more resources to undertake needed reforms, nearly a third of respondents disagreed strongly. Specific recommendations included a reversal of spending on the 12 newest department hires, and diverting the requisite 1.2 million dollars to funding: mental health and substance abuse counselors; non-police sexual assault and domestic violence responders; re-entry services for people leaving the Broome County Jail; rent assistance to low-income families; affording housing developments and remodeling; grants for Black- and minority-owned small businesses; technologies to help facilitate online learning for students; temporary summer employment opportunities for local youth; the construction of a City Youth Center; support for a Substance Abuse/ Harm Reduction

Counseling Center; expansion of available community garden space; and provision of food to families in need. Though the scope of services and programs to which the community expressed a desire to allocate funding is broad, the weight of discussions centered on mental health services, substance abuse services, homelessness, youth groups, and LGBTQA groups. Reductions in the number of officers employed by the Binghamton Police Department would also reduce the number of police and citizen encounters, which some participants cited as a potentially positive outcome. These conversations were marked by frustrations with spending on what is perceived as "military equipment," such as the recently acquired tank. Over half of survey participants reported disagreement that the department should take advantage of opportunities to acquire surplus military equipment. Community members further proposed that such funding decisions be made only after seeking public input.

While discussions relating to the allocation of spending keyed largely off of the number of officers employed by the department and the potential funding that might be made available if the police-to-citizen ratio were reduced, some perspectives proposed that increasing the number of officers in the force might help to achieve some of the reform goals laid out, such as enhancing the mentorship between older and younger officers. It should be noted that some community members also called for defunding the department altogether, and redistributing formerly police funds to social services in order to strengthen the social fabric and find alternatives to enforcement solutions to social problems.

Reform Process

Discussions about reform were characterized by a shared frustration about Binghamton's delayed timeline and lack of publicity in this collaborative effort; nearly 50% of survey respondents reported that they did not know the Reform and Reinvention Collaborative meetings were open to the public, and more than half reported that they did not know the meetings were recorded and posted online. Slightly more than half of survey respondents did, however, report that they had heard of the Collaborative prior to taking the survey. Many participants in public forums both decried lost time, and underscored the imperative that the city not waste any further time in seizing this opportunity to implement change. Furthermore, community members expressed that members selected to serve on the Collaborative Steering Committee do not reflect the community's diversity, nor are they the individuals best-suited to spearhead change on the most salient issues in the city. While a slight majority of participants did not think that Binghamton leaders had made an effort to ensure diverse points of view were represented in the Collaborative discussions, about a third of respondents reported that they did not know either way. The majority of survey respondents perceived that the members of the Collaborative had not worked hard to gather community input. Noting

the 6-month delay of the reform process, community members expressed desires that the timeline for public input, discussion, planning, and execution be extended in kind. Community meetings also highlighted a desire for public input to be sought beyond the end date of the collaborative reform timeline, and that the outcomes of their proposed recommendations be critically evaluated and amended as necessary.

Community conversations and testimony offered starkly contrasting viewpoints. While some members of the community called for all White individual's testimony to be excluded from consideration in the ongoing reform process, others expressed unqualified support and approval for the current activities and conduct of the BPD and its members.

Community members expressed skepticism regarding the likelihood of real community-informed reform. This concern was rooted in recent experiences. The efforts of Divestment Accountability Reinvestment in our Community (D.A.R.O.C.) that culminated in specific guidelines for reform were seen as largely ignored by City leaders, despite the support of hundreds of community members. Numerous participants were extremely anxious that the D.A.R.O.C. guidelines be utilized and referenced in discussions for reform.

Leadership at BPD

It bears noting that some members of the community expressed skepticism about the departments' and city's commitment to effecting police reform. Roughly 50% of survey participants reported disagreement that the Binghamton Police department is receptive to change, Community members cited some local leadership's rhetoric and their understanding that the City abandoned efforts to put forth a Human Rights Commission to make policing more equitable and transparent. Community members also referenced the reputation of the department as one that did not support reform efforts, especially those with respect to racial justice. Public input called for more transparency in the resolution and remediation in department lawsuits and for reform efforts to improve the department's reputation and increase public confidence in local policing. Members of the public also articulated a desire for local leadership to be mindful of the example they set for the rank-and-file, and to consider their role in promoting an inclusive and compassionate culture within the department.

The Research Base

Building Trust

The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that "police and sheriff's departments should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with the citizens they serve."[14] The President's Task Force recommendation is based on a substantial body of research findings, which show a strong *association* between procedural justice and police legitimacy. Similarly, the "workbook" distributed by the governor's office to guide the reform and reinvention efforts across New York State places procedural justice at the center of police-community interactions.[15]

The actions of any authority – a boss in a workplace, a teacher, a judge, or a police officer – can be characterized in terms of procedural justice. Procedural justice is widely thought to consist of four elements:[16]

- Voice, or participation: people believe that they should be given an opportunity to tell their side of a story, explain their situation, and communicate their views.
- Quality of interpersonal treatment: people believe that they should be treated with dignity and respect.
- Trustworthy motives: people believe that authorities should care about their well-being and consider their needs and concerns.
- Neutrality: people believe that decisions should be made evenhandedly and with proper consideration of objective facts, and they draw inferences about neutrality when authorities explain their decisions and justify and account for their actions.

Research holds that procedural justice is instrumental in strengthening public trust and confidence in police and, through that, a sense of duty or obligation to obey the law. The stock of public trust can be built through procedural justice, but it can also be depleted through procedural injustice.

We believe that it's useful to think about procedural justice in police-community engagement at three levels:

- on the street level, as officers interact with citizens with whom they have contact, e.g., providing assistance, taking accident reports, investigating crimes, or taking enforcement actions;

[14] The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015).
[15] New York State, *New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative: Resources & Guide for Public Officials and Citizens* (Albany, NY: Author, 2020).
[16] See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, "Enhancing Police Legitimacy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593 (2004):84-99.

- at the neighborhood level, as police engage with neighborhood associations and other community organizations, addressing neighborhood concerns and solving neighborhood problems; and
- at the leadership level, as police executives engage with formal and informal community leaders, and the community at large.

We address each of these levels as points of entry for reform.

Procedural Justice at the Street Level

At the street level, one line of thinking about reform holds that by following the principles of procedural justice – in allowing citizens voice, treating them with dignity and respect, and so forth – officers can build trust and confidence among the members of the public with whom they individually interact. In this way, presumably, officers can "create" legitimacy.[17] This would call for police departments to take steps to encourage such procedurally just policing, through training, executive exhortation, and other managerial controls. The President's Task Force also advised police agencies to adhere to the principles of procedural justice in their treatment of officers, on the assumption that by doing so, they will foster a commitment to treating citizens with procedural justice.

Few would dispute that any public authority figure should act with procedural justice whenever it is possible to do so. Procedural justice at the street level is of intrinsic value. However, the evidence of the instrumental value of procedural justice in "creating" police legitimacy is limited.[18] Extant research provides weak support for the hypothesis that increases in the procedural justice with which police officers act in their encounters with citizens will produce corresponding increases in the procedural justice that citizens experience, and in turn yield increases in public trust and confidence in police.

Although attitudes toward the police *correlate* with citizens' subjective experiences with the police in individual contacts, the correlation reflects reciprocal causal effects: satisfaction with individual contacts affects more global attitudes toward the police, *and* more global attitudes toward the police shape the perceived quality of police performance in individual police-citizen encounters.[19] Most of the research that

[17] National Research Council, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl (eds.), Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social and Behavioral Sciences and Education (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004).

[18] See Daniel S. Nagin and Cody W. Telep, "Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance: A Revisionist Perspective," *Criminology & Public Policy* (2020).

[19] Steven G. Brandl, James Frank, Robert E. Worden, and Timothy S. Bynum, "Global and Specific Attitudes Toward the Police: Disentangling the Relationship," *Justice Quarterly* 11 (1994): 119-134; Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Amie M. Schuck, Sandra K. Costello, Darnell F. Hawkins, and Marianne K. Ring, "Attitudes

reports on this correlation is based on cross-sectional surveys, which are administered at a single point in time, and so it is unable to disentangle these reciprocal effects. Multi-wave panel surveys, which provide for interviewing the same respondents at two (or more) points in time, allow researchers to estimate each of the reciprocal effects. Such panel studies find that a substantial fraction of the correlation reflects the effect of more general attitudes toward the police on judgments about the quality of citizens' individual contacts with the police. That is, citizens' subjective experiences are shaped by their prior attitudes much more than their experiences shape their subsequent attitudes. Global attitudes tend to be stable, and they have strong effects on citizens' interpretations of their experiences.

To our knowledge, the most direct examination of the effect of officers' procedural justice on citizens' judgments about procedural justice is our study of Schenectady.[20] We conducted a survey of people who had previous contacts with Schenectady police, sampling from among people who called for service, people who were field interviewed (most of them having been stopped), and people who were arrested. We sampled on a semi-monthly basis for 18 months, from mid-July, 2011, through mid-January, 2013, completing interviews by phone with 1,800 people. For a sample of completed interviews, we obtained copies of the video and audio recordings of the incidents captured by the police department's in-car cameras, and from those recordings, trained observers systematically coded elements of the police-citizen interactions. The survey and observational data allowed us to directly compare citizens' reported judgments about procedural justice in their contacts with independent measures of the procedural justice with which officers acted.

We found that, overall, the procedural justice with which officers acted (as coded by independent observers) explained no more than a small fraction (12 percent) of the variation in citizens' judgments. Our findings raise questions about the extent to which procedural justice at the street level is perceived by citizens and can, therefore, affect the public's trust in the police. Based on our study and other research, we doubt that procedural justice in police-citizen interactions can significantly raise levels of police legitimacy, even though procedurally just policing is the right thing for officers to do.

Binghamton

The 2021 survey conducted for the reform and reinvention process reveals moderately high levels of trust and overall perceived procedural justice. We caution that the survey respondents represent a sample of unknown representativeness, and we cannot draw inferences to a larger population. A random or other probability sample of

toward the Police: The Effects of Direct and Vicarious Experience," *Police Quarterly* 8 (2005): 343-365; Tom R. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).

[20] See Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, *Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

respondents might exhibit a different distribution of responses, around which we could estimate confidence intervals. With that caveat, about half of the survey respondents express at least a moderate level of trust in BPD, about 60 percent regard police as polite and helpful, and more than half believe that police are concerned about people's problems. More than half of those with an opinion believe that BPD does a good or very good job of treating people fairly.

Contact surveys are conducted periodically or episodically in some communities. Periodic or even rolling contact surveys can be done economically, designed and executed with probability sampling that forms the basis for statistically estimable inferences to the populations from which the samples are drawn.[21] They can be based on sampling from among different contact populations (calls for service, stops, arrests), and stratified by areas or times of the day. Though survey responses should not be construed as valid indicators of police conduct, they are a valuable source of information about citizens' perceptions and subjective experiences – more valid and reliable, certainly, than citizen complaints or public commendations.

Community Policing and Problem-Solving

Community policing is a demonstrably effective strategy for building trust, even (and especially) among populations that have historically tended to distrust police. When conceived and implemented properly, community policing provides procedural justice at the level of neighborhoods. Community policing is best conceived as a *strategic* innovation that calls for a reorientation of the police mission and associated changes throughout the agency – in the distribution of authority through the chain of command; practices of recruitment, training, and supervision; and the permeability of the organization to its community environment. It is not merely a program to be appended to a police department alongside its other operations, nor is it merely cops on bikes, foot, or horses, or simply participation in community events or coffee with a cop. Community policing might include such deployment of police personnel and outreach, but as elements of a much broader strategy. It is labor-intensive, and so it is not inexpensive. In its best form, it is not only a police initiative, but rather a *city* initiative. Proper implementation is demanding, as one might expect of a reform that has a significant impact.

Mission reorientation means addressing community concerns and priorities. In what has been called the reform era of policing, the more conventional police emphasis on more serious offenses gives way to attending to a broader range of public safety issues, particularly disorder and fear of crime. Research in the 1970s and 1980s showed that fear of crime is tied more closely to *disorder* than to crime. Some disorders are

[21] Sarah J. McLean, Kenan M. Worden, and Robert E. Worden, *Community Perceptions of the Suffolk County Police Department* (Albany, NY: John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2021).

physical in nature: abandoned buildings, vacant lots, or graffiti. Other kinds of disorder are social: street drug dealing, public drinking, or panhandling. All of these disorders are conditions that residents experience day in and day out, and they interpret them, we now know, as *signs of crime*. Disorder detracts from residents' quality of life as they circumscribe their activities, limit their use of public amenities, and even withdraw into their homes. Under community policing, police treat disorder – quality of life issues – as higher priorities, because they are priorities for communities. The breadth of the police role renders police, as one scholar put it, "an agency of municipal government housing a multitude of functions," not merely a law enforcement agency.[22]

Moreover, community policing goes beyond a focus on individual incidents, to which police can devise only temporary solutions. Community policing includes as a major element problem-oriented policing (POP), which is designed to address underlying problems of which individual incidents are merely symptoms. When police are "incident-driven," they respond to and handle incidents one by one. Burglaries, larcenies, disputes of many kinds, public disturbances, persons acting erratically – all or many such incidents may require the presence of police. Problem-oriented policing does not replace but rather supplements police handling of such individual incidents. "Problems" in this context consist of multiple incidents that have common elements – the same or similar types of criminal or disorderly behavior, similar types of places or proximate places, perpetrators with comparable motivations and/or backgrounds (e.g., criminal histories, gang affiliations), etc.

POP can be practiced by police with little input from the community, but as a feature of community policing, POP is firmly grounded in community engagement. Police and the community scan to identify "problems" that multiple incidents represent, and they collaboratively analyze the problems with a view toward the conditions that contribute to or facilitate the incidents. POP is not concerned with "root causes," the likes of which are beyond the capacity of police and community partners to change in the near-term, but rather contributing factors that police and community interventions can alter. The "crime triangle" is a useful tool in this process: based on the premise that a "crime or disorder results when (1) likely offenders and (2) suitable targets come together in (3) time and space, in the absence of capable guardians for that target."[23] Preventive actions may address any of the three factors, or sides of the triangle. With the results of such analysis in hand, POP calls for the formulation of responses that address the conditions. Responses could involve enforcement, but often admit of other kinds of interventions, in addition to or instead of enforcement. At its best, POP represents a public health approach to public safety issues.

[22] Herman Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1977).

[23] ASC Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/problem-analysis-triangle-0

The Gainesville (FL) police offer an illustrative – and exemplary – application of problem-oriented policing.[24] Having suffered an increase in convenience store robberies, police undertook an analysis that revealed that 96 percent of Gainesville convenience stores had been robbed in preceding five years. Examining the patterns of robbery events in incident report narratives, they found that 92 percent of convenience store robberies occurred with a single clerk on duty. By interviewing incarcerated offenders who had been convicted of robbing convenience stores, they learned that robbers regarded a second clerk as a deterrent. Police recommended that the city council adopt an ordinance requiring two clerks on duty at night. The ordinance was passed, and in the next six months, convenience store robberies dropped by 65 percent.

POP applies not only to crime patterns but to other neighborhood problems as well, including disorders. Not every problem-solving effort needs to be so extensive as that in Gainesville, and they need not involve legislative action. Responses may require enforcement but often involve – in addition or instead – non-enforcement responses.

Charlotte Gill and her colleagues conducted a systematic review of community policing evaluations.[25] They found that community policing was defined in many different ways, and typically as a program rather than a strategy. Many police departments that claim to have adopted community policing have adopted only a faint version of it, and the fidelity with which the adopted form was implemented varied. The hypothesized impacts of community policing extended across a range of outcomes, one of which, illogically, is crime. It seems that we reflexively assess police strategies in terms of their crime control role, but we should not assess community policing only or primarily in terms of its crime reduction impacts.

Gill, et al. evaluated community policing as it was practiced by the agencies subject to evaluation research, not community policing at its best. Their search yielded 25 studies that satisfied their minimum criteria for scientific rigor. Across these studies, and despite the fact that most were not "model" community policing initiatives, the findings indicate that community policing was effective in improving public attitudes toward police and reducing perceived disorder. Feelings of safety also increased, though the effect did not reach statistical significance.[26]

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[24] Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

[25] Charlotte Gill, David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep, Zoe Vitter, and Trevor Bennett, "Community- Oriented Policing to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear and Increase Satisfaction and Legitimacy among Citizens: A Systematic Review," *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 10 (2014): 399–428. Also see Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper, Charlotte Gill, Julie Hibdon, Cody Telep, and Laurie Robinson, *An Evidence-Assessment of the Recommendations of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing — Implementation and Research Priorities* (Fairfax, VA: Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason University; Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2016), pp. 28-31.

[26] However, Weisburd and Eck report that some forms of community policing have been found to reduce fear. See David Weisburd and John E. Eck, "What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593 (2004): 42–65.

Arguably, the best example of community policing can be found in a long-term evaluation of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), from 1993 to 2004.[27] CAPS was initiated by Chicago's mayor, and the mayor "owned" the initiative, in that he took steps to ensure that other agencies coordinated with the police department to address community concerns. He thereby ensured a level of interagency cooperation that is not normal in many places. Thus when neighborhoods directed police attention to issues that called for action by, say, sanitation or public works, the issues were referred to the appropriate city agency, and the agency followed up.

Over time – it was neither quick nor easy – the Chicago Police Department (CPD) effected many changes to support community policing. Community policing requires mechanisms of public engagement, and the public needs an opportunity structure for involvement. CPD engaged the community in monthly beat meetings. Problems vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, and policing must vary with them, which implies that authority must reside at the local-level. Insofar as a "turf orientation" fosters knowledge and attachment among the officers assigned to neighborhoods, stable assignments and a high level of beat integrity in dispatching patrol units to calls for service are desirable, albeit challenging, to put into practice. CPD trained officers and community members in problem-solving, and in many of Chicago's beats, problem-solving was practiced fairly well.[28]

Skogan's long-term, comprehensive evaluation of CAPS showed that it was largely successful, especially in predominantly Black neighborhoods.[29] Residents' perceptions of physical decay and disorder as neighborhood problems – such as graffiti, abandoned cars, abandoned buildings, trash and junk – all improved. Their perceptions of social disorders – disruptions around schools, public drinking, or groups of people loitering – improved some. As police and other agencies effectively addressed physical and social disorders, or signs of crime in residents' minds, we would expect to see residents' fear of crime decrease, which the evaluation confirmed. Finally, attitudes toward police improved – that is, police legitimacy increased in African-American and White neighborhoods. Residents' assessments of police performance increased, as did their judgments about the responsiveness and demeanor of police. Values on a quality-of-service index went up.

Community policing is procedural justice at a neighborhood level. It gives the community voice concerning its problems and accords respect to community priorities. It reflects police concern for community well-being. It is also effective insofar as multi-

[27] Wesley G. Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[28] Wesley G. Skogan, Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, Jennifer T. Comey, Marianne Kaiser, and Justine H. Lovig, *Problem Solving in Practice: Implementing Community Policing in Chicago* (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2000), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/179556.pdf.

[29] CAPS was not nearly so successful in Hispanic beats, where cultural and language barriers formed obstacles that were not overcome by 2004.

faceted responses to identified problems are more successful. Community policing can work when it is conceived and implemented as a strategic innovation.

CAPS was never formally discontinued, but it shriveled due to changing executive priorities.[30] Now Chicago is mounting a new community policing initiative. The clear lesson from the CAPS experience is that community policing requires on-going administrative commitment and support.

As we noted above, many agencies' implementation of community policing has been much less ambitious. Many agencies report that acquiring the resources needed for community policing was a major challenge. In 2006, Mastrofski et al. (2007) surveyed the 566 county and municipal police agencies with at least 100 sworn officers, and among the 355 responding agencies, more than half (52.7 percent) reported that "getting sufficient resources to do community policing right" had been "very" or "extremely" challenging.[31] Less than one-third (30.7 percent) reported that they had been very or extremely successful on that score.

Moreover, the operation of community policing cannot rest on police alone. Other agencies have a part to play in addressing neighborhood problems. Coordinating with those agencies and securing their cooperation is essential in fulfilling community expectations. CAPS was a city initiative, and not only an initiative by CPD, which surely enhanced inter-agency coordination and cooperation. Of course the community has a vital part to play in coproducing community safety, and community participation is often especially challenging in the neighborhoods most in need.

Binghamton

BPD's Community Response Team (CRT), consisting of seven officers (including a sergeant), addresses quality of life issues throughout Binghamton. It fields complaints directly and works with complainants to devise solutions. The CRT sergeant also maintains contacts with Neighborhood Watches and other groups, including businesses.

It may be that the practice of community policing and POP by BPD adheres to all of the principles that extant research would highlight as keys to effective implementation, but we should stress several of them for further consideration. First, problem-solving can be performed by the police acting on problems that police identify; problem-solving as an element of community policing requires that police address problems about which the community is concerned. Thus it is imperative that BPD ensure that its engagement with neighborhood residents and other stakeholders (such as business operators) allow and encourage bi-directional communication about neighborhood concerns. Scanning can and should be based both on information internal to BPD, such as officers' observations or call-for-service data, and on community

[30] Wesley G. Skogan, "Why Reforms Fail," *Policing & Society* 18 (2008): 23-34.

[31] Stephen D. Mastrofski, James J. Willis, and Tammy Rinehart Kochel, "The Challenges of Implementing Community Policing in the United States," *Policing* 1 (2007): 223-234.

input. Further collaboration, in the analysis phase, would include tapping community members' knowledge about the dimensions of the problems, and keeping the community informed about the efforts that are being made. It might also extend to enlisting community members in implementing responses. Community engagement can be challenged by low levels of public involvement, which is often skewed in favor of homeowners, older residents, and those of higher socioeconomic status. Even so, engagement is critical to building public trust.

Second, officers and supervisors should be trained to perform POP and other community policing functions (such as organizing and moderating community meetings). Third, notwithstanding the motivation and competencies of the officers on the ground, supervisory personnel should ensure that proper attention is given to problems identified by the community, analysis is of an appropriate scope, response plans are prepared and implemented, and assessment is completed.

Fourth, experience with problem-solving indicates that "… drawing on a wide array of non–law-enforcement tactics can be effective in reducing crime and disorder."[32] Thus efforts should be made to ensure that responses incorporate, as feasible and applicable, a range of approaches beyond or instead of police presence or enforcement.

Finally, we note that a single unit consisting of 7 officers is likely stretched rather thin in addressing neighborhood problems across the entire city. A problem-solving unit of this kind can be effective so long as the demands do not exceed its capacity to perform. More robust community policing, including the kind of engagement and "turf orientation" that communities appreciate will likely require additional personnel. Sworn personnel are currently down to 128 full-time from 145 in 2007.

Executive Engagement with the Community

Several years ago, we conducted interviews with formal and informal leaders in Capital District cities, in an effort to ascertain the primary forces that shape their judgments about the respective police departments and its leadership.[33] We describe here the broad themes that emerged from the interviews. They echo the community-level elements of procedural justice to which the President's Task Force alluded in its report.

Reflecting the procedural justice concept of voice, the extent to which the department creates or participates in opportunities to engage with community members is a powerful force in shaping leaders' views. Examples include pop-up BBQs and movie nights, police involvement in athletic leagues, civilian police academies, and

[32] Weisburd and Eck, "What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?", p. 59.

[33] Sarah J. McLean, Robert E. Worden, Caitlin Wilkens, and Danielle Reynolds, "Building Police Legitimacy: Foundations of Sovereigns' Trust," unpublished working paper (Albany, NY: John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2018).

attending and participating in community meetings. Informal forms of engagement by all ranks of the department, such as taking time to stop, talk, and listen to people in the community, are also valued. Community stakeholders interpret these formal and informal engagements as signaling genuine attempts by the police to hear community concerns and become acquainted with the people they serve. They appear to have a "humanizing" effect.

The community assesses accessibility partially by the ease with which community leaders can interact with higher-ranking department members as needed and not limiting access to scheduled community engagement events or to the department's timetable. Local examples of accessibility included: command staff who shared their cell phone number, responded promptly and personally to emails, agreed to informal meeting requests, and proactively called or emailed community leaders to obtain their input. Our research shows that this more personal, one-on-one communication and outreach by chiefs and their command staff members resonates very strongly with community leaders. While it is a powerful force in shaping views, we have found that chiefs' willingness and ability to engage in this leadership style vary.

Departments whose policies, operations, and decision-making are generally transparent are more likely to be trusted. Making crime data readily available and broken down at the neighborhood level, sharing police activities, posting policies and annual reports on the Internet, and hosting information sessions to explain programs and policies to the community promote transparency.

The community assesses the leadership of the department based on formal programs. Community leaders consider the extent to which program priorities align with the community's perceived needs and preferences. Department leaders should take deliberate steps to raise awareness about the programs and policies they have in place, which speaks further to transparency. Where chiefs have established trusted connections with informal and formal community leaders, those leaders can share the positive steps the department is taking with the larger community to develop and build a bank of trust. Programmatic initiatives have at least some capacity to generate trust and confidence in the police, even among those who have reservations about the extent to which the front line embraces those initiatives.

Community leaders also assess their local police department's legitimacy by comparing it with departments across the nation. In doing so, they reported at that time that Capital District police departments fared quite well. Community leaders take notice of the alignment between the command staff's posture and that of the officers responsible for carrying out programs and policies.

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With respect to these dimensions of executive- and departmental-level procedural justice, we note that several BPD policies – use of force, body-worn cameras,

in-car camera, portable audio video recording gear, public recording of law enforcement activity – are accessible online. Many agencies now make most policies accessible, excepting only those (e.g., active shooter policies) that are law enforcement sensitive, in the interest of transparency.

BPD officers are equipped with body-worn cameras, with prescribed activation extending to all calls for service and arrest situations, and any police-initiated actions, which is more inclusive than that in New York State's model policy.[34] Supervisors are required to review 4 hours of body-worn camera recordings each month for the purposes of training and accountability.

Community input to the reform and reinvention process, discussed above, included calls for greater transparency with respect to complaints against BPD officers, and with respect to enforcement patterns, particularly stops, arrests, and use of force. Statistical summaries of complaints, complaint allegations, and dispositions could be posted on the BPD website. So too could periodic statistical summaries of enforcement activities, like those presented above. Crime maps are currently available (though only through 2019).

BPD conducts outreach in several forms and operates several types of programs that many communities support. One program has been in many places controversial: school resource officers. The advantages and disadvantages of school resource officer (SRO) programs have been hotly debated. Research findings on the effects of SROs are mixed, though the best evidence appears to show that the presence of SROs may increase the numbers of recorded violent, weapons, and drug offenses, and increase the severity of responses to minor offenses. However, "there is great variation across schools and districts in terms of the actual roles and responsibilities taken on by SROs," such that the effects of SRO programs are likely contingent on local protocols and practices.[35] Stakeholders in Binghamton should be mindful of the potential drawbacks of an SRO program.

Other BPD programs include the Citizen Police Academy, the Police Athletic League camp, and the Handle with Care program. The Citizen Police Academy is one means of educating the citizenry about police programs, policies, and procedures, which was one suggestion heard in the community meetings.

More generally, community input signaled an interest in greater engagement based on an expanded range of communication channels. Some departments form

[34] New York State Municipal Police Training Council, Body-Worn Camera Model Policy (Albany, NY: Division of Criminal Justice Services, 2015). The model policy of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) prescribes activation in a much broader set of circumstances: "… all contacts with citizens in the performance of official duties," with limited and specific exceptions. See International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Body-Worn Cameras: Model Policy* (Arlington, VA: Author, 2014), p. 1.

[35] Denise C. Gottfredson, Scott Crosse, Zhiqun Tang, Erin L. Bauer, Michele A. Harmon, Carol A. Hagen, and Angela D. Greene, "Effects of School Resource Officers on School Crime and Responses to School Crime," *Criminology & Public Policy* 19 (2020):, p. 909.

community advisory committees, which have the potential to institutionalize a means whereby the department can hear from the community, and at the same time better ensure that the community has access to information about the department. One example was cited in New York State's resource guide:

> ... the Albany Police Department (APD) has had a positive experience using such a mechanism for continued community policing and engagement. The department sought assistance from the city's Common Council to ensure all 15 wards of the city were equally represented on the Community Policing Advisory Committee. This committee was charged with reviewing and addressing items to reinvigorate the relationship between community members and APD.[36]

Internal Structures

Policies Governing Use of Force

As noted above, many use of force policies have included a use of force continuum, which rests on the basic principle that force should be proportional to resistance. A 2006 survey of more than 650 agencies found that 80 percent included a continuum in their policies.[37] Community input in Binghamton included a suggestion that BPD establish more than the current three levels of force. Though use of force continua have been widely used, no consensus emerged on the placement of types of force relative to one another, or to forms of resistance.

More recently, statements about use of force policy make it clear that decisions about force are and should be based on many factors, including resistance. For example, in April 2016, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police convened a symposium to address the current state of policing, generally, and use of force, in particular. Several of the leading law enforcement leadership and labor organizations were invited to attend.[38] The goal was to form a consensus and synthesize the views of the participating organizations, from which a single document could be derived that would better inform individual agencies' policies. The document, the *National Consensus Policy on Use of Force*, was published in January

[36] New York State, *New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative*, pp. 44-45.

[37] William Terrill and Eugene A. Paoline, III, "Examining Less Lethal Force Policy and the Force Continuum: Results from a National Use-of-Force Study," *Police Quarterly* 16 (2013): 38-65.

[38] The other organizations included: the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies; the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies; the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association; the Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association; the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training; the National Association of Police Organizations; the National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives; the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives; and the National Tactical Officers Association.

2017. Resistance is a part of the totality of the circumstances that officers are expected to evaluate.

> The totality of the circumstances can include, but is not limited to, the immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; whether the subject is actively resisting; the time available for the officer to make decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving; the seriousness of the crime(s) involved; and whether the subject is attempting to evade or escape and the danger the subject poses to the community. Other factors may include prior law enforcement contacts with the subject or location; the number of officers versus the number of subjects; age, size, and relative strength of the subject versus the officer; specialized knowledge skill or abilities of the officer; injury or level of exhaustion of the officer; whether the subject appears to be affected by mental illness or under the influence of alcohol or other drugs; environmental factors such as lighting, terrain, radio communications, and crowd-related issues; and the subject's proximity to potential weapons.

New York State's model policy similarly identifies a number of factors that influence the reasonableness of force:[39]

- The severity of the crime or circumstance;
- The level and immediacy of threat or resistance posed by the suspect;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers, and suspects;
- The risk or attempt of the suspect to escape;
- The knowledge, training, and experience of the officer;
- Officer/subject considerations such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury or exhaustion, and the number of officers or subjects; and
- Other environmental conditions or exigent circumstances.

Very little evidence has accumulated on the efficacy of policy in regulating officers' use of force, and no particular use of force policy can be said to be evidence-based. Terrill and Paoline found, in an analysis of three police departments, the lowest incidence of force in the department with the most restrictive use of force policy. Another study showed that in Cincinnati, police use of force decreased 46 percent between 2002 and 2012, following reforms – including, but not limited to, changes in use of force policy – mandated by a federal court.[40] Similarly, use of force by Portland (OR) police dropped following reforms in that city, though as in Cincinnati, the evidence does not permit us to isolate the effects of policy changes from the effects of other contemporaneous reforms.[41]

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[39] New York State Municipal Police Training Council, Use of Force Model Policy (Albany: DCJS, 2020).

[40] Joshua M. Chanin, "Examining the Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct Reform," *Police Quarterly* 18 (2015): 163–92. Also see Worden and McLean, *Mirage of Police Reform*, chap. 10.

[41] Timothy Prenzler, Tyler Cawthray, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey Alpert, "Reducing Public Complaints and Use of Force: The Portland Police Bureau Experience," *Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice* 2 (2016): 260–273.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) asserts that "… it is essential that every law enforcement agency ensure and be able to document that its officers employ only the force that is objectively reasonable to effectively bring an incident under control and only the level of force that a reasonably prudent officer would use under the same or similar circumstances." More specifically, "The policy should ideally cover, with a few specific exceptions, the reporting of any use of force occurring while an officer is acting in their official law enforcement capacity," to include physical force of various types (e.g., open-handed strikes, punches, or kicks), chemical force, impact force, electronics force, firearms force, and vehicular force.[42]

Use of force reporting like that described by the IACP "…can be used for a variety of purposes, not the least of which is to protect officers. For example, agencies are in a much better position to defend themselves against charges of excessive force if they can document the types of situations in which their officers have used force," and they can "more readily defuse charges that can tarnish officer and agency credibility within the community."[43] Such data supports analysis based on the concept of the force factor (discussed above), the findings of which can inform the further development of policy and training. Furthermore, when the use of force data are merged with other data – e.g., offense data captured in incident reports – they will allow for periodic analysis of racial and ethnic disparities. Ideally, in our view, such analysis would statistically control for as many of the factors in the totality of circumstances that properly influence officers' use of force as possible. Regression analyses, like those presented above, can be performed to statistically control for factors other than citizens' race/ethnicity. Alternatively, propensity score matching or weighting can be applied to form a set of similarly situated incidents involving White subjects with which the incidents involving Black subjects could be directly compared, and from which inferences about bias could be drawn.

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BPD's use of force policy is consistent with the model policy promulgated by New York State's Municipal Police Training Council, with respect to the forms of force that are authorized and the circumstances under which they may be used, as well as requirements for officers to intercede and report when another officer uses force beyond that which is objectively reasonable. BPD policy exceeds the state requirement with respect to reporting of use of force incidents, data on which we analyzed and summarized above.

[42] IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center, *Reporting Use of Force: Concepts & Issues Paper* (Alexandria, VA: Author, 2017), pp. 2 & 3.
[43] IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center, *Reporting Use of Force: Concepts & Issues Paper, p. 2.*

We believe that the BPD use of force data would allow for more informative analysis if it provided for more structured reporting on forms of force, such as check boxes for:

- The use of restraint devices, including handcuffs and leg restraints;
- The use of specific escort techniques, including come-along, bent-wrist, and pressure-point techniques;
- The use of arm-bar or leg-sweep takedowns;
- The use of strikes, including closed-hand, forearm, elbow, knee, or leg strikes;
- The use of conducted energy weapons, including whether it was only drawn or deployed and, if deployed, the deployment distance and number of cycles.

The data captured in this way would afford a stronger basis on which to assess current patterns, potential training needs, and potential policy changes.

Policies Governing Search and Seizure

Conventional police wisdom holds that proactive policing – that is, officer-initiated contacts with violators or suspicious persons – is an effective crime control tactic, and the findings of social research have, for the most part, supported this proposition. Studies using different methodologies with different strengths and weaknesses have found that the incidence of some types of crime declines, or is lower than one would otherwise predict, when and where the police frequently make traffic stops or investigatory ("Terry") stops of vehicles and/or pedestrians.

Conventional wisdom also holds that the crime control benefits of proactive policing may come at the price of police legitimacy, as stops may detract from public trust in the police. While social science evidence does not support strong causal inferences on this question, the experience of some cities – particularly New York City – underscores the imperative of carefully regulating the exercise of officers' discretion in stops and post-stop actions, including frisks and searches. Police behavior must remain within Constitutional bounds, and it may not be based on racial or ethnic biases.

Even when stops are effected within Constitutional requirements, they represent intrusions into citizens' lives, amounting to social costs that should be borne at no more than socially optimal levels. Furthermore, the law governing "Terry stops" is complex, so much so that it is likely that sometimes officers will unwittingly make legally insufficient stops.[44] Stops are occasions on which officers might further intrude unjustifiably, even if unintentionally, into citizens' private affairs by conducting an improper search. Gould and Mastrofski found that searches were fairly infrequent – about one every ten hours in the field – but nearly one-third of the searches were unconstitutional. The officers most prone to conduct illegal searches were in general good cops whose searches were seen

[44] Jeffrey Fagan, "Terry's Original Sin," *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 2016 (2016): 43-96.

as "normal and necessary" in the war on drugs.[45] Gould and Mastrofski leave open – but could not empirically test – the possibility that some or much of the search-related misconduct was due to officers' lack of knowledge about legal requirements. Other studies have shown that many officers do not have a good working knowledge of the legal rules that govern warrantless searches and seizures.[46]

In 2013, the district court ruled in *Floyd v. City of New York* that the NYPD's practice of stop, question, and frisk was unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of discrimination based on race.[47] Disparities in stops and post-stop outcomes by the NYPD are well-documented; whether and to what extent the disparities stemmed from police bias has been contested. The influence of bias is difficult to isolate and discern, but it is an important question to address.

Many jurisdictions mandate that their officers complete reports on all such stops, including demographic information on the citizens whom they stop, the reasons for the stops and other actions that officers might take. The reports enable supervisors to review officers' actions and take corrective steps as needed. Such data also form the foundation for analyses on the basis of which patterns of stops and post-stop outcomes can be evaluated for evidence of racial or ethnic bias. Satisfactory baselines or benchmarks are difficult to establish, but it is better to have the information available and seek a proper basis for interpreting it than to remain blind to the patterns.

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BPD officers have been required to complete a form on every stop/detention since 2010. Until last June, they were to complete a "demographic form," 710Z; since then, the form is opened in BPD's mobile system, and handwritten forms were thereafter not permitted. Supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with the reporting requirement.

The form provides for information on the reasons for stops and, if applicable, searches, so that supervisors can review the bases for the enforcement actions to ensure that officers' stops and detentions are Constitutional, with corrective instruction provided as needed. Given the complexities of search and seizure law, and the importance of properly regulating officers' use of their authority to stop, detain, frisk, and search motorists and pedestrians, supervisory review is critical.

[45] Jon B. Gould and Stephen Mastrofski, "Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution," *Criminology & Public Policy* 3 (2004): 315-361.

[46] See William C. Heffernan and Richard W. Lovely, "Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law," *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 24 (1991): 311-69; John Madison Memory and Barbara Smith, *Line Police Officer Knowledge of Search and Seizure Law: Results of an Exploratory Multi-City Test* (Columbia, SC: Authors, 1988).

[47] *Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 08-CV-1034*,

Periodic analysis of the stop data should, we believe, be conducted periodically to assess racial and ethnic disparities for signs of bias. In doing so, it is imperative that an acceptable benchmark (not the demographics of the residential population) be applied.[48]

Workforce Diversity

The diversity of the police department workforce plays a part in shaping community leaders' views of legitimacy. Some degree of legitimacy is granted based on how the community perceives the department's leadership as meaningfully working to promote diversity, even if those efforts are not entirely successful.

The underrepresentation of Blacks and Hispanics in the police workforce is the rule rather than the exception in American police departments.[49] Increasing diversity has been quite challenging, and research offers few clues to how the challenge can be met. One review of research observed that "Available literature on best practices in hiring and retention is almost entirely based on expert opinions, anecdotal accounts, and limited descriptive research, not scientific evaluation."[50] One recent study concluded that, "Taken together, this literature suggests that while some progress has been made, it is not clear what factors best predict success in achieving greater racial and ethnic representation within a policing workforce."[51]

[48] See Roland Neil and Christopher Winship, "Methodological Challenges and Opportunities in Testing for Racial Discrimination," *Annual Review of Criminology* 2 (2019): 73–98; and Greg Ridgeway and John MacDonald, "Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing," in Stephen K. Rice and Michael D. White (eds), *Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential Readings* (New York: NYU Press, 2010). Also see, e.g., Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean and Andrew P. Wheeler, "Testing for Racial Profiling with the Veil-of-Darkness Method," *Police Quarterly* 15 (2012): 92-111; Robert E. Worden, Kenan M. Worden, and Hannah Cochran, *Traffic Stops by Suffolk County Police* (Albany, NY: John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2020).

[49] Mike Maciag, "Where Police Don't Mirror Communities and Why It Matters," Governing (August 28, 2015), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-police-department-diversity.html.

[50] Lum, et al., , *An Evidence-Assessment of the Recommendations of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing — Implementation and Research Priorities*, p. 15. Also see Jeremy M. Wilson, Erin Dalton, Charles Scheer, and Clifford A. Grammich, *Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium: The State of Knowledge* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

[51] Jeffrey Nowacki, Joseph A. Schafer and Julie Hibdon, "Workforce Diversity in Police Hiring: The Influence of Organizational Characteristics," *Justice Evaluation Journal* (2020), p. 4.

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In 2016, a diversity task force offered recommendations for expanding the applicant pool in order to diversify the BPD.[52] A website was designed as a one-stop shop from which interested parties could view job opportunities, access civil service forms, and contact recruitment personnel. Social media were used to promote BPD employment. Achieving diversity is an on-going challenge, on which the community expects to see on-going efforts.

Training

The effects of police training have been seldom estimated in systematic research. In 2000, a committee of experts formed by the National Research Council (NRC) took stock of research on police policies and practices. Their report, published in 2004, noted that the effects of training could be examined through either controlled experiments or non-experimental analyses with statistical controls, and concluded that "There are too few of either type of study available to shed light on the effects of training."[53] They added that "prior research has not taken into account the substantive content of the training, modes of instruction, the abilities of the instructors, the timing of the training, or the organizational support for reinforcing the objectives of the training program."[54]

By the time that the President's Task Force issued its report, which called for more training, the body of research on police training had not grown much. A review of the evidence base for the Task Force recommendations affirmed that the NRC Committee's characterization of the evidence on training effects remained accurate: "there is little or no evaluation evidence for most of the categories of training recommended by the Task Force."[55] In the last few years, though, several studies have expanded the base of evidence somewhat.

The National Initiative to Build Community Trust and Justice, a demonstration project funded by the Department of Justice, included training in procedural justice and implicit bias as two of its three core components in six pilot police departments. The evaluation found that the training had effects on officers' knowledge; it did not examine behavioral outcomes.[56] Other evaluations of procedural justice training have detected

[52] See https://www.pressconnects.com/story/news/public-safety/2016/09/27/diversity-ranks-city-boosts-police-recruiting/90918278/ and https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/triad/news/2016/09/21/binghamton-police-department-diverse-recruitment- .

[53] National Research Council, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*, p. 142.

[54] Ibid., p. 141.

[55] Cynthia Lum, et al., *An Evidence-Assessment of the Recommendations of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing — Implementation and Research Priorities*, p. 34.

[56] Jesse Jannetta, Sino Esthappan, Jocelyn Fontaine, Mathew Lynch, and Nancy LaVigne, *Learning to Build Police-Community Trust* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2019). Results varied from one department to the next, but the differences were only noted and not discussed further.

some effects on beliefs and attitudes; one recent study detected behavioral impacts.[57] Our evaluation of implicit bias training in the New York City Police Department found that the training had moderate effects on officers' awareness of and knowledge about implicit bias, small effects on officers' attitudes about discrimination, and no detectable effects on disparities in enforcement.[58]

Lum, et al. summarized the evidence on crisis intervention team (CIT) training, which has been shown to have positive impacts on officers' beliefs and attitudes relating to interactions with persons with mental illness. They also noted that a systematic review found "null overall effects" on arrests of and use of force on persons with mental illness.[59]

Training police in de-escalation is the subject of only recent research. Engel, McManus, and Herold conducted a systematic review of de-escalation training, reporting that "only one study evaluating a training explicitly designed to reduce officer use of force in their interactions with citizens was identified."[60] Most studies were of training in the fields of nursing and psychiatry. Since then (i.e., January of 2019), two evaluations have been completed. One, which examined training in social interaction – the Tact, Tactics, and Trust (T3) training program – found that though the training had positive effects on officers' attitudes toward procedurally fair communication in police-citizen interactions, no effects on trainees' use of force were detected.[61] The second

[57] Dennis P. Rosenbaum and Daniel S. Lawrence, *Teaching Respectful Police-Citizen Encounters and Good Decision Making: Results of a Randomized Control Trial with Police Recruits* (Chicago: National Police Research Platform, no date); Wesley G. Skogan, Maarten Van Craen, and Cari Hennessy, "Training Police for Procedural Justice," *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 11 (2015): 319-334; Emma Antrobus, Ian Thompson, and Barak Ariel, "Procedural Justice Training for Police Recruits: Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial," Journal of Experimental Criminology 15 (2019): 29-53; Mengyan Dai, "Training Police for Procedural Justice: An Evaluation of Officer Attitudes, Citizen Attitudes, and Police-Citizen Interactions," *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles* (2020).

[58] Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean, Robin S. Engel, Hannah Cochran, Nicholas Corsaro, Danielle Reynolds, Cynthia J. Najdowski, and Gabrielle T. Isaza, *The Impacts of Implicit Bias Awareness Training in the NYPD*, Report to the New York City Police Department (Cincinnati: IACP / UC Center for Police Research and Policy & the John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, 2020).

[59] Lum, et al., *An Evidence-Assessment of the Recommendations of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*, p. 36. Also see Amy C. Watson, Victor C. Ottati, Melissa Morabito, Jeffrey Draine, Amy N. Kerr, and Beth Angell, "Outcomes of Police Contacts with Persons with Mental Illness: The Impact of CIT. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Services Research* 37 (2010): 302-317.

[60] Robin S. Engel, Hannah D. McManus, and Tamara D. Herold, *The Deafening Demand for De-escalation Training: A Systematic Review and Call for Evidence in Police Use of Force Reform* (Cincinnati: IACP/UC Center for Police Research and Policy, 2019), p. 30.

[61] Scott Wolfe, Jeff Rojek, Kyle McLean, Geoffrey Alpert, "Social Interaction Training to Reduce Police Use of Force," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 687 (2020): 124-145; Kyle McLean, Scott E Wolfe, Jeff Rojek, Geoffrey P Alpert, Michael R Smith, "Randomized Controlled Trial of Social Interaction Police Training," *Criminology & Public Policy* 19 (2020): 805-832.

study evaluated the delivery of the ICAT training by the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD). The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) developed the ICAT (Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics) curriculum.[62] The LMPD evaluation found not only changes in officers' attitudes attributable to the training, but also impacts on officers' use of force. Engel, et al. estimated that use of force decreased 26 percent, injuries to citizens decreased 26 percent, and injuries to officers decreased 36 percent.[63]

The United Kingdom's College of Policing conducted an experimental evaluation of a pilot stop and search training program, delivered in six police forces. The impact evaluation found that the training: (1) marginally improved officers' stop and search knowledge, which was already strong; (2) had a modest impact on officers' attitudes; (3) affected officers' anticipated, or hypothetical search decisions (based on responses to vignettes); and (4) had a small (but statistically insignificant) effect on officers' recorded search rates, and no effect on racial/ethnic disparities in searches.[64]

Though we believe that most departments do not invest adequately in police training, we also believe that formal training curricula cannot by themselves fulfill public expectations for officers' preparation to effectively resolve the situations that they are called upon to address. Lum and her colleagues point to the challenge to any form of training in the "transfer" of learning into performance. Gaps between learning and performance "can be explained by a combination of learner (e.g., cognitive ability, motivation level), intervention (e.g., reinforcement, error-based examples, modeling), and work environment (e.g., peer and supervisor support, organizational culture) characteristics."[65] Formal training must be reinforced and amplified in day-to-day practice.

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The community meetings reflected a clear interest in ensuring that police are properly trained for the tasks that they perform and the diverse segments of the public

[62] Police Executive Research Forum, *ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for Defusing Critical Incidents* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2016).
[63] Robin S. Engel, Nicholas Corsaro, Gabrielle T. Isaza, and Hannah D. McManus, *Examining the Impact of Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT) De-escalation Training for the Louisville Metro Police Department: Initial Findings* (Cincinnati: IACP/UC Center for Police Research and Policy, 2020).
[64] Joel Miller and Banos Alexandrou, *College of Policing Stop and Search Training Experiment: Impact Evaluation* (London: College of Policing, 2016); Joel Miller, Paul Quinton, Banos Alexandrou, and Daniel Packham, "Can Police Training Reduce Ethnic/Racial Disparities in Stop and Search? Evidence from a Multi-Site UK Trial," *Criminology & Public Policy* 19 (2020): 1259-1287. Also see Chris Giacomantonio, Tal Jonathan-Zamir, Yael Litmanovitz, Ben Bradford, Matthew Davies, Lucy Strang, and Alex Sutherland, *College of Policing Stop and Search Training Experiment: Process Evaluation* (London: College of Policing, 2016).
[65] Lum et al., *An Evidence-Assessment of the Recommendations of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing — Implementation and Research Priorities*, p. 34.

with whom officers interact. BPD officers receive at least 40 hours of in-service training annually. BPD has delivered training in procedural justice, using the same well-reputed curriculum used in the National Initiative, which was developed through a collaboration of the Yale University Law School and the Chicago Police Department. Once called Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy ("PJ1") and Tactical Mindset ("PJ2"), the curricula have been rechristened Principled Policing. Four BPD officers completed New York State's train-the-trainer course, and they are able to deliver training in procedural justice locally as needed. BPD has also provided training in diversity.

As of September of 2020, 20 percent of BPD officers had been trained and certified in CIT training, and the remainder of the officers had received training in mental health awareness (such as Mental Health First Aid). BPD has conducted in-service training in de-escalation through both lecture and reality-based training scenarios. It might be beneficial for BPD to consider PERF's ICAT curriculum, or portions thereof, as it further develops its de-escalation training.

Community input noted the availability of resources to assist with training officers on topics relating to domestic violence.

External Oversight

External or citizen oversight of the police is often taken to mean that civilians play a role in the review of complaints against the police. The fundamental rationale for "civilian review" has been that police cannot be trusted to investigate their own and hold them accountable: complainants would be discouraged; investigations would be conducted half-heartedly; complaint dispositions would be tilted against sustained findings; and thus the deterrent function that discipline should play would be undermined by procedures that made it unlikely that misconduct would be punished. The involvement of community members who are not police officers in the review of citizen complaints, advocates expect, would better ensure that the complaint intake process is receptive to complainants and that investigations are thorough, resulting in a higher rate of sustained complaints, and a correspondingly greater probability that officers would be sanctioned for misconduct. In addition, one might expect that complainants would have better experiences with the review process, and the public at large would have more trust in the complaint system.

Few of these expectations have been fulfilled by extant forms of citizen oversight.[66] In general, small fractions of complaints eventuate in a sustained finding,

[66] The body of empirical research on citizen oversight is rather modest. See, e.g., Michele Sviridoff and Jerome E. McElroy, *Processing Complaints Against Police in New York City: The Complainant's Perspective* (New York: Vera Institute, 1989); Wayne Kerstetter, and Kenneth A. Rasinski, "Opening a Window into Police Internal Affairs: Impact of Procedural Justice Reform on Third-Party Attitudes," *Social Justice Research* 7 (1994): 107-127; Douglas W. Perez, *Common Sense about Police Review* (Philadelphia: Temple

regardless of citizen oversight. When complaint allegations are not sustained, some instead result in exoneration; this means that the officer acted as the complaint claimed, but the action was proper, suggesting that the complaint was based on a misunderstanding of police procedure, or of what police may, must, or may not do. Some complaint allegations are "unfounded," meaning that the evidence tends to show that the officer did not engage in the alleged conduct; this may indicate that the complainant misperceived or misrepresented the event. Finally, some complaints are not sustained because the preponderance of the evidence neither confirms nor disconfirms the allegation. Many such complaints involve an allegation by the complainant, a denial by the subject officer, and no corroborating evidence.

Citizen oversight has not altered these patterns. Nor does the evidence indicate that complainants find more satisfaction in complaint review when it includes a civilian role. Complainant satisfaction is strongly correlated with complaint outcomes; few complainants whose complaints are not sustained express satisfaction with the process. Some evidence indicates that citizen oversight fosters a somewhat greater faith in the process: among people who believe that they have a reason to complain, those who are aware that their city has a civilian review board are somewhat more likely to file a complaint.

A substantial proportion of people who have a complaint choose not to file a formal complaint and instead avail themselves of other options. Some call a police station and speak with a police supervisor. Some call the police chief's office. Some contact an elected official. Some evidence indicates that the further a complaint becomes involved in a formal, adjudicative process, the less likely s/he is to be satisfied with the process or the outcome.

Citizen oversight takes many different forms. A recent study by the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) classified oversight agencies into one of three categories.[67] Investigation-focused oversight agencies

University Press, 1994); Stephen Clarke, "Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails," *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems* 43 (2009): 1-49; Joseph DeAngelis, "Assessing the Impact of Oversight and Procedural Justice on the Attitudes of Individuals Who File Police Complaints," *Police Quarterly* 12 (2009): 214-236; William Terrill and Jason Ingram, "Citizen Complaints Against the Police: An Eight City Examination," *Police Quarterly* 19 (2016): 150-179; Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, Citizen Oversight of the Albany Police, 2010 (Albany, NY: The John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2010), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/99/attachments/original/1458055985/4-Albany-Finn-Institute-Report.pdf?1458055985; Robert E. Worden, Heidi S. Bonner and Sarah J. McLean, "Procedural Justice and Citizen Review of Complaints against the Police: Structure, Outcomes, and Complainants' Subjective Experiences," *Police Quarterly* 21 (2018): 77-108.

[67] Joseph DeAngelis, Richard Rosenthal, and Brian Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models* (NACOLE, 2016). Also see Joseph DeAngelis, Richard Rosenthal, and Brian Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence* (NACOLE, 2016).

provide for complaint investigations by civilian investigators who are independent of the police agency. The greater independence of the investigations may engender greater trust in the investigative findings, though they may also duplicate police (internal) investigations, thereby increasing the costs. DeAngelis, et al. add that "disillusionment among the public may develop overtime [sic] when community expectations for change are not met."[68] Review-focused agencies typically focus on the quality of investigations by police investigators, and may request additional investigation. They often consist of a board comprised of volunteers. They are thus less costly, and may nevertheless enhance public trust in the complaint review process, though they enjoy less independence from the police. The third category includes agencies variously called auditors or monitors, which focus on *patterns* in the quality and outcomes of complaint investigations; auditors may audit complaint investigations even if they do not perform them, in order to ensure that the investigations are thorough and worthy of the public's trust. Auditors also perform systematic reviews of police policies, practices, or training, and make recommendations for change.

The auditor model is quite different in its systemic orientation, with less (or no) attention devoted to individual complaints. Samuel Walker, long a proponent of citizen oversight, noted that "An increasing number of observers argue that, even with sufficient powers and resources, an oversight agency that focuses only on the investigation of complaints will have little long-term impact on the overall quality of police services in the field."[69] Walker sees more promise in the auditor model, which "focuses on the police organization, seeking to change policies and procedures in ways that will prevent future misconduct."[70]

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The community expressed an interest in the establishment of a form of citizen oversight of the complaint review process. Should Binghamton determine that it wishes to move forward, it has many choices to make and many factors to consider.

The cost of an investigation-focused oversight agency or an auditor will be pronounced, relative to the number of complaints, in a city of Binghamton's size. Furthermore, any model of oversight encompasses specific forms that differ from one another on many specific dimensions. Careful deliberation about the options should include an assessment of:

[68] Ibid., p. 7.

[69] Samuel Walker, "The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department's 'Pattern or Practice' Suits in Context," *St. Louis University Public Law Review* 22 (2003), p. 24.

[70] Ibid., p. 25. Also see Samuel Walker and Carol A. Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2nd ed.; Beverly Hill: Sage, 2013); and Debra Livingston, "The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review," *Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law* 1 (2004): 653-669.

- the current process and its outcomes, including the proportions of complaints that are sustained, unfounded, exonerated, and not sustained;
- how the pattern of outcomes has been affected by the introduction of body cameras; and
- how – and how much – the pattern could be expected to change with either external investigations or only external review of internal investigations.

Details about the authority of the agency, its procedures, and the selection of parties who have authority are all consequential for the operation of the agency and its standing with the community.

We would add that no matter the model of citizen oversight that Binghamton adopts, a mediation program would be well worth considering. The outcomes of mediation can in some – perhaps many – cases be superior to those of a more formal, adjudicative process, which is not compatible with many complainants' objectives.[71]

Police Functions and Resources

The role of police in modern society is a broad one, spanning several functions. As Egon Bittner commented many years ago, based on his field work observing police in various settings:

> … it is often said that it would be altogether better if policemen were not so often called upon to do chores lying within the spheres of vocational competence of physicians, nurses, and social workers, and did not have to be all things to all men. I believe that these views are based on a profound misconception of what policemen do, and I propose to show that no matter how much police activity seems like what physicians and social workers might do, and even though what they actually have to do often could be done by physicians and social workers, the service they perform involves the exercise of a unique competence they do not share with anyone else in society. …. Though policemen often do what psychologists, physicians, or social workers might be expected to do, their involvement in cases is never that of surrogate psychologists, physicians, or social workers. They are in all these cases, from the beginning, throughout, and in the last analysis, policemen, and their interest and objectives are of a radically distinct nature.[72]

The "unique competence" of police, Bittner argued, lies in their coercive authority:

> … what the existence of the police makes available in society is a unique and powerful capacity to cope with all kinds of emergencies: unique, because they are far

[71] See, e.g., Lonnie M. Schaible, Joseph DeAngelis, Brian Wolf, and Richard Rosenthal, "Denver's Citizen/Police Complaint Mediation Program: Officer and Complainant Satisfaction," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 24 (2012): 626-650.

[72] Egon Bittner, "Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police," in Herbert Jacob (ed.), *The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), p. 31.

> more than anyone else permanently poised to deal with matters brooking no delay; powerful, because their capacity for dealing with them appears to be wholly unimpeded.[73]

Consequently, the services that police provide range widely, as police are called upon

> … to pull a drowning person out of the water, to prevent someone from jumping off the roof of a building, to protect a severely disoriented person from harm, to save people in a burning structure, to disperse a crowd hampering the rescue mission of an ambulance, to take steps to prevent a possible disaster that might result from broken gas lines or water mains. and so on almost endlessly ….[74]

Bittner argued that modern societies need an agency that wields the coercive authority that has been bestowed on police. Even though the "unique competence" of the police need not be invoked in many instances to which officers are summoned, they are, Bittner maintained, situations whose resolution *might* require the exercise of coercion. And this need is not evenly distributed across social space: it tends to be concentrated in disadvantaged, socially disorganized neighborhoods, which in the U.S. tend to be neighborhoods of color.

Though the coercive authority of police plays a vital role in a civilized society, it should be used as sparingly as possible. As Mark Moore observes, "All other things being equal, we would like the police to use the authority we grant them sparingly. …. In an important accounting sense, we have to recognize the grant of authority to the police as an asset, and count its use in police operations as a cost to be weighed against the benefits of lowering crime."[75]

This broad police role can be disaggregated in terms of several functions. At about the same time that Bittner was writing, James Q. Wilson described policing as consisting of three major functions: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service.[76] Order maintenance, as Wilson described it, encompasses public disturbances and disputes between or among two or more people; such incidents may or may not involve the violation of a law or ordinance. The service function includes tasks that, as Wilson observed, could be provided by other agencies or by the private market; police performed them due mainly to their round-the-clock availability. As Bittner did, Wilson stressed that much of a police officer's day-to-day work was not law enforcement as such. Other research showed that the modal tour of duty did not involve an arrest.[77]

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[73] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[74] Ibid., p. 30.

[75] Mark H. Moore, *Recognizing Value in Policing: The Challenge of Measuring Police Performance* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2002), p. 23.

[76] James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[77] Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *The Police and the Public* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

Gordon Whitaker formed a parsimonious set of categories to summarize the frequency with which police handle different kinds of problems; his findings provide a sense of how often the three police functions are performed.[78] Whitaker applied this set of categories to data collected for the Police Services Study in 1977, which included information collected in 24 police agencies through systematic social observation: trained observers accompanied patrol officers on their tours of duty during a sample of 900 patrol shifts. Thus the information about the nature of the problems is based on all of the information that became available to the observed officer at the scene, and not only the information available at the time the unit was dispatched. Whitaker's findings are shown in Table 16.[79]

Table 16. Police Functions: Police Services Study Observations, 1977, and Binghamton Calls for Service, 2017-2019

Category	Police Services Study – observation*	Binghamton – citizen requests for service
Crime/law enforcement		
Violent crime	4%	0.7%
Non-violent crime	18%	11.6%
Suspicious person/ circumstances	11%	13.1%
Other crime/law enforcement	4%	6.3%
Disorder/order maintenance		
Interpersonal dispute	10%	14.1%
Public nuisance / morals offense	15%	14.1%
Service		
Medical	4%	6.3%
Dependent person	6%	9.3%
Information request	6%	-
Other assistance	10%	13.1%
Traffic	26%	11.3%

* some incidents included in 2 or 3 categories; percentages sum to more than 100

Table 16 also summarizes the expansive nature of community requests for police assistance in Binghamton calls for service, mapping BPD's 120 call type codes into Whitaker's categories. Table 16 includes only BPD incidents about which someone in the community requested police assistance by calling 911 or a non-emergency number;

[78] Gordon P. Whitaker, "What Is Patrol Work?" *Police Studies* 4 (1982): 13-22.

[79] Information requests were often fielded by officers directly, without transmission through a communications center.

it excludes incidents that police themselves initiated. Traffic stops are thus excluded, as are most building checks. Thus the percentages are not directly comparable to Whitaker's, which include all observed police encounters, and which are classified on full information about the nature of the incident. Across the 3 years, 99,140 such citizen requests were handled by BPD.

Some categories represent situations that call for the performance of a law enforcement function. Violent crimes included mainly assaults and robberies in Binghamton. Among the non-violent crimes, burglaries, criminal mischief, larcenies, harassment, and trespassing were most common. Other crime and law enforcement calls involved warrant arrests and other police investigations. Suspicious persons or circumstances included suspicious activity, open doors or windows, and alarm calls for police business.

Other categories include situations of an order maintenance nature. Interpersonal conflicts included disputes, fights, and domestic conflicts. Public nuisances encompassed disturbances, noise complaints, persons annoying, and animal complaints.

Dependent persons included welfare checks, missing or runaway persons, and "mental health law" calls. Other forms of assistance involved downed wires, road hazards of various sorts, other hazardous conditions, lost or found property, fires, and a wide assortment of other forms of assistance.

Police recognize that they are not the solution to many of these problems. They are, by the nature of their role and authority, a stopgap in many instances – a "provisional" solution to emergent problems, as Bittner put it. Disorders are often resolved (at least temporarily) without recourse to officers' coercive authority; they are situations in which officers' authority might be – but frequently is not – necessary.

In 2021, in many communities, some have called for diverting some types of incidents from the police workload. This is not a new idea. In the 1980s, as municipal governments and police departments grappled with how to manage fiscal cutbacks, many police departments devised protocols for differential police response: providing for delayed or alternative responses (e.g., telephone reporting of minor crimes) to calls for service rather than the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit.[80] They identified types of requests for assistance that could be safely and effectively removed from the dispatch queue. In one department, for example, cases of theft or vandalism in which the dollar value of the loss or damage was below a monetary threshold, and no information was available that would form leads for investigation, crime reports could be taken by phone without compromising police performance, because such cases would not be assigned for follow-up investigation anyway.[81]

[80] J. Thomas McEwen, Edward F. Connors, III, and Marcia I. Cohen, Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test (Washington: National Institute f Justice, 1986).

[81] Robert E. Worden, "Toward Equity and Efficiency in Law Enforcement: Differential Police Response," *American Journal of Police* 12 (1993): 1-32.

As we discuss below, the same principle has been applied in some jurisdictions (including Broome County) to calls involving persons in mental crisis, and it is conceivable that this principle could be extended to some other types of calls for service as well. Though at least a fraction of the incidents that Whitaker characterized as service are matters whose successful resolution might require police authority, the matters that could most likely be diverted from the police queue to other parties are those in this category. We caution that one factor to consider in making such judgments is the quality of the information gathered by phone from a caller. An analysis of Police Services Study data traced the differences between the classification of crime calls at the time of dispatch and those at the conclusion of the encounter, finding evidence of substantial misclassification at the time of dispatch.[82] Errors in diverting calls from the dispatch queue stemming from the quality of the available information could have calamitous consequences. Insofar as calls can be diverted to alternatives without adverse consequences, officers' time would be freed for community policing activities.

Other approaches to conserving the application of police authority are available. Diversion programs are one means of facilitating the use of alternatives to arrest. Programs that partner police with mental health specialists are another.

Deflection & Alternatives to Arrest

Police-led diversion – or deflection from the criminal process – is not new, but it has attracted renewed interest in the last several years. The opioid crisis has prompted a number of law enforcement agencies to develop or adopt innovative approaches to drug possession and/or offending driven by drug use. Such programs enable police agencies to better support the common and long-standing practice of discretionary non-enforcement; officers frequently opt not to invoke the law – making custodial arrests or issuing citations – even when they have the authority to do so. For example, Terrill and Paoline (2007) analyzed observational data on 729 police encounters with non-traffic suspects, for whom police had evidence presumptively sufficient to make an arrest. Most (94 percent) of these encounters involved less serious offenses. In nearly two-thirds of these cases, officers neither made an arrest nor issued a citation. Instead, officers warned suspects (in 32 percent), commanded or requested that the individual discontinue his/her behavior (17 percent), made referrals to third parties of an official (a mental health facility) or unofficial (family member) nature (12 percent), provided information or counsel (10 percent), or did nothing (11 percent).[83] Deflection programs

[82] David A. Klinger and George S. Bridges, "Measurement Error in Calls-for-Service as an Indicator of Crime," *Criminology* 35 (1997): 705-726.

[83] William Terrill and Eugene A. Paoline, III, "Non-Arrest Decision Making in Police-Citizen Encounters," *Police Quarterly* 10 (2007): 308-331.

facilitate connecting offenders who have behavioral health problems with services that may not only reduce their likelihood of offending but improve their quality of life.

The law enforcement assisted diversion (LEAD) program has achieved some prominence as a police-led diversion initiative. First conceived and implemented in Seattle in 2011, LEAD provides for the voluntary diversion of drug offenders from criminal prosecution to treatment in the community. In Seattle and other jurisdictions that have adopted LEAD programs in the years since, diversion is based on a harm reduction approach, targeting offenders whose criminality is driven by substance abuse. That is, the objective was not abstinence, but the mitigation of harms to the offenders, people in the offenders' lives, and the community. In Albany, LEAD provides for broader eligibility based not only on substance abuse, but also mental illness, homelessness, and chronic poverty, and on a much wider set of drug and non-drug charges. LEAD has been hailed as a program that can extricate repeat, low-level offenders from the "revolving door":

> Despite policing efforts, drug users and dealers frequently cycle through the criminal justice system in what is sometimes referred to as a "revolving door." The traditional approach of incarceration and prosecution has not helped to deter this recidivism. …. There have thus been calls for innovative programs to engage these individuals so they may exit the revolving door. …. The primary aim of the LEAD program is to reduce criminal recidivism.[84]

Other program models exist. For example, Stop, Triage, Engage, Educate, and Rehabilitate (STEER), formed and implemented in Montgomery County, Maryland, links drug users to treatment. Montgomery County police officers may divert consenting drug-involved offenders to treatment through a community-based case manager – a "care coordinator" co-located in the police department – who meets the officer in the field. This is an "intervention contact." Officers may also refer drug-involved individuals against whom police have no probable cause for an arrest in what STEER calls a "prevention contact." STEER is designed for people with high need for drug treatment but low to moderate risk for crime. Referrals turn partly on structured assessments that officers administer in the field to assess criminogenic risk, and the care coordinator applies a substance use screen to assess treatment needs.[85]

None of the program models is evidence-based. Seattle's LEAD program was evaluated in terms of outcomes, claiming a 58 percent reduction in recidivism.[86] The

[84] Susan E. Collins, Heather S. Lonczak, and Seema L. Clifasefi, *LEAD Program Evaluation: Recidivism Report* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2015).

[85] *Focus on Innovation: Montgomery County STEER*, http://www.addictionpolicy.org/single-post/STEERprogram. Also see Jac Charlier, "Want to Reduce Drugs in Your Community? You Might Want to Deflect Instead of Arrest," *The Police Chief* (September 2015): 30-31.

[86] Susan E. Collins, Heather S. Lonczak, and Seema L. Clifasefi, *LEAD Program Evaluation: Recidivism Report*. Seattle: University of Washington, 2015.

methodological weaknesses of that evaluation cast considerable doubt on that conclusion, however.[87] A more recent evaluation of Santa Fe's LEAD program yielded at best mixed findings.[88]

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Community input reflected a perception that a structured program of diverting from criminal processing offenders with substance use disorders would fill a need. Neither call-for-service records nor incident reports suffice to gauge the number of offenders whose criminality is driven by behavioral health issues, so we cannot estimate the magnitude of the need or its potential benefit. If a program is to be established, it will of course require strong partnerships with service providers, as well as community outreach to ensure that potential beneficiaries and their support networks understand the intent and nature of an offer of diversion.

We should add, in this connection, that BPD's CRT partners with the Addiction Center of Broome County to identify individuals at high risk of overdosing and conduct home visits or other contacts to facilitate services.

Responding to People in Mental Crisis

The virtues of non-traditional (i.e., not enforcement-driven) responses to persons with mental illness are in 2021 well-recognized. Three models for alternative responses have been predominant: a police-based specialized response; a police-based specialized mental health response; and a mental health-based specialized mental health response.[89]

Crisis intervention teams (CIT) provide for training police officers so that they are better able to recognize and respond effectively to persons with mental illness, and to be more aware of mental health treatment resources. Improved recognition and communication skills are thought to enable officers to de-escalate situations and reduce the likelihood that officers make arrests or use force. The evidence on the effectiveness of CIT training is mixed.

Mobile crisis teams (MCT) provide for civilian mental health workers who co-respond when requested by police. Mental health specialists draw on a broader and deeper knowledge of mental illnesses and their symptoms, enabling them to better fit

[87] Robin S. Engel, Robert E. Worden, Nicholas Corsaro, Hannah D. McManus, Danielle L. Reynolds, Hannah Cochran, Gabrielle T. Isaza, and Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas, *The Power to Arrest: Lessons from Research* (New York: Springer, 2019).

[88] New Mexico Sentencing Commission, *Santa Fe Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD): An Analysis of the Pilot Phase Outcomes* (Albuquerque: Author, 2018).

[89] See Engel, et al., *The Power to Arrest*.

their response to the situation. Unfortunately, the evidence on the effectiveness of MCTs is quite limited and weak.

Centralized crisis response provides for an assessment site at which police can drop off persons exhibiting acute symptoms of mental illness. The sites include streamlined intake procedures and no-refusal policies. Officers are able to return to patrol quickly, while clients receive emergency psychiatric assessment and stabilization, whereupon they are referred for mental health services.

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The Mental Health Association of the Southern Tier (MHAST) operates Mobile Crisis Services.[90] Mobile Crisis staff respond when police officers (or other providers) request their assistance or when they are dispatched by 911. They assess the situation and determine a course of action, which could involve transporting the individual to the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP), making a connection with outpatient services, or counseling at the scene.

In addition, MHAST's Crisis Intervention Team

> … worked closely with many partners implementing a 911 distressed caller diversion program, which is the first of its kind in the State of New York. This program links 911 dispatchers with United Health Services Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP). Trained dispatchers access the level of risk to the caller and transfer qualified callers, linking them directly with mental health assistance, putting the consumer first, avoiding a police response, and avoiding unnecessary transports to the hospital.[91]

As noted above, 20 percent of BPD officers have been trained in CIT, and the remainder of the officers have been trained in mental health awareness. In 2017-2019, BPD officers were dispatched to 2,103 calls with a call type of "mental health law," and in an additional 254 incidents, BPD recorded a person's condition as mentally disordered. Among these 2,357 incidents, 39 (1.7 percent) eventuated in an arrest. Police reported using force in 65 (2.6 percent).

Service Delivery and Funding in a Federal System

We noted in the introduction the report of the Kerner Commission, which cited the need for "massive and sustained" investments to reduce poverty and inequality.[92] Whether a greater investment in addressing public problems – unemployment, mental

[90] See https://mhast.org/mobile-crisis.html.

[91] https://mhast.org/crisis-intervention.html. Also see CIT International, *Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs: A Best Practice Guide for Transforming Community Responses to Mental Health Crises* (Memphis, TN: Author, 2019), pp. 114-116.

[92] Fred Harris and Alan Curtis, "The Unmet Promise of Equality," *New York Times* (February 28, 2018).

illness, homelessness, substance abuse – should be made is not a question that science can definitively answer; it is a question of values and thus resolvable only through political deliberation. If, however, one takes as a value premise the need for greater investment, then the source of the funding arises as a question on which theory and data shed some light.

City residents receive many different services from city and county governments. City governments rely on limited tax bases and are subject to systemic pressures to keep tax rates low, so that they can compete for residents and businesses. City funding consequently tends to be allocated for economic development and for basic services whose benefits are widely shared: e.g., police and fire protection; street repair; sanitation. Cities tend not to expend much on what can be characterized as redistributive programs, whose benefits are limited mainly or entirely to residents in need.

In New York State, most of the expenditures for social service, mental health, and public health programming are made by county, not city, governments. Much of the revenue for those programs comes in the form of state and federal aid. County governments have the infrastructure through which services are provided, but a substantial fraction of the funding for those services is not from local taxation, thereby accommodating the competitive pressures to which local governments are subject.

In contemplating how to support a greater investment in addressing the needs of disadvantaged neighborhoods, then, it is important to appreciate that responsibility for administering social service programs is shared unequally among different levels of government, and that responsibility for funding social service programs also is shared unequally among different levels of government. Moreover, the two responsibilities are not distributed across governments in the same way.

Police budgets in particular, especially for central cities, are often inadequate to offer compensation levels that suffice to attract and retain good talent, and to allow for the initial and on-going training necessary to perform the critical and demanding role that police play, and which communities expect. Furthermore, engaging with the community, and mounting responses to neighborhood (or city-wide) problems with multi-dimensional responses that promise to conserve the use of police authority, require resources beyond those necessary to maintain the capacity for emergency response. Given these premises, it follows that support for other social services will require taping revenue streams other than those that support police budgets.

Control of Violence and Other Crime

According to Uniform Crime Report (UCR) figures for 2019 (the most recent year for which complete data are available), Binghamton recorded 355 Part I violent offenses, for a rate of 798.2 per 100,000 population. The count of violent crimes included 245

aggravated assaults (a rate of 550.9 per 100,000 population) and 66 robberies (a rate of 148.4). U.S. cities in Binghamton's UCR population group of 25,000-49,999 had a mean violent crime rate of 270.5 per 100,000, a rate of aggravated assaults of 175.3, and a robbery rate of 53.4. The population group of cities with populations of 50-100,000 had rates of 333.2, 214.0, and 75.8, respectively. Thus, Binghamton's rates of violent crime were approximately two to three times that of cities of comparable size. We caution that comparisons of UCR-based crime rates across jurisdictions can be misleading. The cities vary to unknown degrees with respect to reporting by crime victims and police agencies' recording practices, which could distort judgments about any one city's crime.

Binghamton's rates of gun crime are more nearly similar to those of other cities in its population group: a firearm robbery rate of 18.0 per 100,000 population, and a firearm aggravated assault rate of 41.4. Binghamton's rates were 27.0 (with 12 gun robberies) and 49.6 (22 gun assaults), respectively. Shootings, which are not tabulated for the UCR program but are tabulated in New York State for GIVE jurisdictions, are fairly low in Binghamton relative to other cities in the state. Table 17, below, displays for each

Table 17. Rates of Shootings in Selected New York State Cities.

Police Department	2019 Sworn*	2019 Population**	Annual Shootings***	Shootings per 10 officers	Shootings per 10,000 population
Newburgh City PD	80	28,177	24	3.00	8.52
Buffalo City PD	729	255,284	205	2.81	8.03
Rochester City PD	738	205,695	159	2.15	7.73
Syracuse City PD	403	142,327	110	2.73	7.73
Niagara Falls City PD	146	47,720	21	1.44	4.40
Utica City PD	162	59,750	24	1.48	4.02
Albany City PD	293	96,460	38	1.30	3.94
Poughkeepsie City PD	89	30,515	12	1.35	3.93
Schenectady City PD	161	65,273	16	1.00	2.45
Troy City PD	128	49,154	11	0.86	2.24
Binghamton City PD	131	44,399	7	0.53	1.58
Kingston City PD	71	22,793	3	0.42	1.32
Yonkers City PD	598	200,370	25	0.42	1.25

* Source: https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/2019-le-personnel.pdf

** Source: United States Census

*** Source: https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/greenbook.pdf (July, 2020), computed five-year average, 2015-2019, rounded to nearest integer

of the selected jurisdictions rates of shooting incidents per 10,000 population (in the far right column), and rates of shootings relative to police personnel (shootings per 10 officers). Rates of shootings in the City of Binghamton were, in 2015-2019, lower than those in all but two of the other twelve cities.

Community input cited concerns with crime control. Police efforts to control crime, and to address the racial and ethnic disparities in personal safety and security noted above, could potentially contribute to disparities in enforcement: in stops, searches, tickets, and arrests. This potential underscores the need to formulate and execute crime control strategies that focus as narrowly as possible on places and people at high risk of involvement in crime.

Hot Spots Policing

Criminological theory and research has identified a number of factors that shape the spatial distribution of crime, which tends to be concentrated in fairly small areas that many have come to call crime hot spots.[93] Strategically focusing police resources on hot spots of crime has become a widely-accepted police tactic. A number of studies have shown persuasively that crime in such hot spots can be reduced to some extent through deploying police units to hot spots, and/or directing police patrol resources to hot spots.[94]

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Hot spots policing in Binghamton is driven by spatial analyses of crime patterns by the intelligence center, which identified locations in which crime is concentrated. Particular attention is given to gun crime, and the information is complemented with intelligence on street drug markets and debriefings of arrestees. Directed patrols designed to achieve a high level of police visibility are deployed to identified hot spots.

[93] On the spatial concentration of crime, see, e.g., John Eck, Ronald Clarke, and Rob Guerette, "Risky Facilities: Crime Concentration in Homogenous Sets of Establishments and Facilities," *Crime Prevention Studies* 21 (2007): 225-264; Lawrence Sherman, Patrick Gartin, and Michael Buerger, "Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place," *Criminology* 27 (1989): 27-55; William Spelman, "Criminal Careers of Public Places," *Crime Prevention Studies* 4 (1995): 115-144; David Weisburd, "The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place," *Criminology* 53 (2015): 133-157.

[94] See Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos, and David M. Hureau, "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis," *Justice Quarterly* 31 (2014): 633-663; Elizabeth Groff, Jerry Ratcliffe, Cory Haberman, Evan Sorg, Nola Joyce, and Ralph Taylor, "Does What Police Do at Hot Spots Matter? The Philadelphia Policing Tactics Experiment," *Criminology* 53 (2015): 23-53; Richard Rosenfeld, Michael J. Deckard, amd Emily Blackburn, "The Effects of Directed Patrol and Self-Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A Randomized Controlled Study of Hot Spot Policing," *Criminology* 52 (2014): 428-449; Lawrence Sherman and David Weisburd, "General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime Hot Spots: A Randomized, Controlled Trial," *Justice Quarterly* 12 (1995): 625-648.

We would offer two observations, without meaning to imply that BPD's current practice of hot spots policing is in either respect deficient. First, the optimal geographic size of hot spots for the purpose of hot spots policing is not, to our knowledge, a matter on which evidence has accumulated. However, given findings that crime levels vary from block to block, at a "micro" level, over long periods of time, small, narrowly circumscribed hot spots may be presumptively desirable.[95] The more that policing concentrates on the areas that are demonstrably high-risk, the less likely that lower-risk areas are subject to policing that is unduly intensive. Second, some experience indicates that the potential detrimental effects of hot spots policing on public trust can be mitigated or averted through community outreach that explains what police will do and its rationale.[96]

Focused Deterrence

Focused deterrence – also known as "pulling levers" – strategies share a number of common components of hot spots policing, and follow the same general framework. Once a particular crime problem (such as gang-involved gun violence) is identified as the focus, an interagency working group first conducts research to identify offenders, gangs, and behavior patterns, and then frames a response designed to offer a range of sanctions – or levers to be pulled, as necessary – to deter offenders. The threats that these sanctions represent are communicated directly to identified offenders, through media described below. At the same time that this deterrence message is being delivered, community resources are focused on targeted offenders and groups to further induce a cessation of violent behavior. Such strategies are implemented by a multi-agency consortium to ensure that a variety of sanctions can be used against these chronic offenders, and also that a variety of services are available to them to facilitate the choice to desist from crime. Cincinnati's initiative summarizes the pulling levers message succinctly: "We will help you if you let us, but we will stop you if you make us."[97]

[95] See David Weisburd, Shawn D. Bushway, Cynthia Lum, and Sue-Ming Yang, "Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the City of Seattle," *Criminology* 42 (2004): 283-322; Andrew P. Wheeler, Robert E. Worden, and Sarah J. McLean, "Replicating Group-Based Trajectory Models of Crime at Micro-Places in Albany, NY," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 32 (2016): 589-612.
[96] See James Shaw, "Community Policing Against Guns: Public Opinion of the Kansas City Gun Experiment," *Justice Quarterly* 12 (1995): 695-710; and Steven Chermak, Edmund F. McGarrell, and Alexander Weiss, "Citizen Perceptions of Aggressive Traffic Enforcement Strategies," *Justice Quarterly* 18 (2001): 365-391.
[97] Robin S. Engel, S. Gregory Baker, Marie S. Tillyer, John Eck, and Jessica Dunham, *The Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV): Year 1 Report* (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute, 2008), p. 6

Focused deterrence strategies rest on the fundamental assumptions that offenders are rational, and that confronting offenders directly is the first step toward altering their perceptions of risk. They further assume that such direct communications may also reverberate through the informal communication network of offenders, especially if they are gang-involved.[98] The success of a pulling levers strategy depends on two factors: how well the response is tailored to the selected crime problem, and whether or not the promises that are made (regarding subsequent law enforcement crackdowns and access to social services) are kept. Offenders are able to quickly ascertain hollow threats and empty promises.

One focused deterrence strategy, now known as the Group Violence Intervention (GVI), focuses additional enforcement efforts on the small number of offenders who are responsible for a disproportionate share of gun violence, and particularly the members of gangs and other violent groups. Gang and other group members are directly warned of the enforcement regime: what will happen if gun violence occurs, and why – that the community wants the violence to stop. A key communication mechanism is a face-to-face meeting with group members, which is sometimes called a "call-in" or "offender notification forum." When gun violence occurs and a member of a gang or group is responsible for it, the shooter is held individually accountable, as always through prosecution. In addition, the entire group is held collectively accountable for the gun violence of their members, as every legally available enforcement "lever" is pulled with respect to the members of that group. The prospect of such enforcement attention presumably prompts group members to exert informal social pressure on their associates to refrain from gun violence, thereby altering the group dynamics in socially beneficial ways. Group members are also invited to take advantage of services that can help them change their lives for the better, an invitation that offers a meaningful alternative for a better lifestyle choice.

Anthony Braga and his colleagues recently completed a meta-analysis of focused deterrence initiatives, including evaluations of twelve applications of the group violence intervention.[99] In addition to Boston's pioneering Operation Ceasefire in the 1990s, evaluations have been conducted in: Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Lowell, Stockton, Los Angeles, Rochester, Boston ("Ceasefire II"), Chicago, New Orleans, Kansas City, and New Haven. Across the evaluations of GVI, Braga, et al., report an average effect size of 0.657, which can be interpreted as an effect of medium (0.5) to large (0.8) magnitude.[100]

[98] Edmund F. McGarrell, Steven Chermak, Jeremy M. Wilson, and Nicholas Corsaro, "Reducing Homicide through a 'Lever-Pulling' Strategy," *Justice Quarterly* 23 (2006): 214-231.

[99] Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd, and Brandon Turchan, "Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence," *Criminology & Public Policy* 17 (2018): 205-250.

[100] On the interpretation of effect sizes, see Jacob Cohen, *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences,* 2nd edition (Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ, 1988).

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Given the level of gun violence in Binghamton, and the low profile of street gangs in descriptions of crime control efforts, leads us to cautiously infer that the group violence intervention is not needed in Binghamton. Nor did we hear references to street drug markets of a sort that would call for the drug market intervention.

Situational Crime Prevention

Situational crime prevention begins with the objective of reducing *opportunities* for crime and disorder. Based on an analysis of the circumstances associated with specific types of crime and disorder, it formulates modifications to the physical environment or its management designed to alter the opportunity structure for those behaviors. The principal ways by which situations can be modified to reduce the likelihood of offending are:

- increasing the difficulties of committing the offense;
- increasing the immediate risks of apprehension;
- reducing the rewards or benefits of the offense;
- removing excuses for offending that offenders may use to rationalize the offense; and
- reducing temptations and provocations to commit the offense.

According to Ronald Clarke, "… more than 250 evaluated successes of situational crime prevention have been reported, covering an increasingly wide array of crimes including terrorism and organized crimes."[101]

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) shares these same concerns with opportunities for crime and disorder, concentrating on the respects in which features of the environment afford such opportunities. In any location, CPTED considers modifications of the building, the site, and the location, and how that place is managed and used. Somewhat more specifically, the modifications may involve: (1) controlling access (with fences, hedges, gates, or signage); (2) improving visibility (though lighting, landscape maintenance); or (3) defining ownership and encouraging the maintenance of territory (through signage, or maintenance that shows that some cares and is a sign of guardianship).

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BPD is part of a multi-agency CPTED team, which meets on a regular basis. The team also includes representatives of Binghamton Code Enforcement, the Binghamton Fire Department, the City Zoning Office, the city schools, the Mayor's office, Corporation

[101] Ronald V. Clarke, "The Theory and Practice of Situational Crime Prevention," in Criminology and Criminal Justice, Oxford Research Encyclopedia.

Counsel, and analysts. The team applies the elements identified above – access control, visibility, and ownership – to identified problem locations.

Street Outreach

Cure Violence – originally known as CeaseFire-Chicago, first implemented by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP) in 1995 – applies what it characterizes as a public health approach to violence prevention.[102] That is, violence is viewed as a serious health threat in the same way that polio, smallpox, and HIV/AIDS is. The disease metaphor implies that the spread of violence can be interrupted. According to then-CPVP Executive Director Gary Slutkin, "punishment doesn't drive behavior. Copying and modeling and the social expectations of your peers is what drives your behavior."[103] A two-stage approach toward violence follows from this premise. First, Slutkin proposes to, as you would if you were fighting tuberculosis, "find those who are most infectious and stop the transmission. This means going after young men most likely to fire a gun and set off a spiral of further violence and try to stop them pulling the trigger. The longer-term aim, like treating AIDS, is to change the behavior of the whole group so that shooting (like unsafe sex) becomes unacceptable in the peer group, even gang communities."[104]

Evaluations of Cure Violence have produced mixed findings. Positive impacts were found in Chicago and Baltimore.[105] These findings have been challenged, however. Commenting on the Chicago evaluation, after a review of other evidence on Chicago CeaseFire, Fox and his colleagues allow that "… contrary to popular belief, the CeaseFire program may not have been as effective in reducing violence as first promoted."[106] Fox, et al. also raise questions about the effectiveness of the Baltimore program. Null findings were observed in Newark and New Orleans.[107]

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[102] For a comprehensive description and evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, see Wesley G. Skogan, Susan M. Harnett, Natalie Bump, and Jill DuBois, *Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago* (Chicago: Northwestern University Institute for Policy Research, 2008).

[103] Alex Kotlowitz, "Blocking the transmission of violence," *The New York Times Magazine* (May 4, 2008).

[104] Damian Whitworth, "Street violence is an infection. I can cure it," *The Times* (July 2, 2008). Available online at http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article4251027.ece.

[105] See Skogan, et al., *Evaluation of Ceasefire-Chicago*; and Daniel W. Webster, Jennifer Mendel Whitehill, Jon S. Vernick, and Elizabeth M. Parker, *Evaluation of Baltimore's Safe Streets Program: Effects on Attitudes, Participants' Experiences, and Gun Violence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for the Prevention of Youth Violence, 2012).

[106] See Andrew M. Fox, Charles M. Katz, David E. Choate, and E.C. Hedberg, "Evaluation of the Phoenix TRUCE Project: A Replication of Chicago CeaseFire," *Justice Quarterly* 32 (2015): 85-115.

[107] See Douglas J. Boyle, Jennifer L. Lanterman, Joseph E. Pascarella, and Chia-Cherng Cheng, "The Impact of Newark's Operation Ceasefire on Trauma Center Gunshot Wound Admissions," *Justice Research and Policy* 12 (2010): 105-123 (though we note that Newark's program was a peculiar hybrid of CureViolence and focused deterrence); and Eric McVey, Juan C. Duchesne, Siavash Sarlati, Michael O'Neal, Kelly

Two cities' experiences with interventions based on the Cure Violence model are cautionary tales, however, inasmuch as the interventions appeared to have *detrimental* effects, yielding *higher* levels of violence. In their evaluation of Pittsburgh's One Vision One Life initiative, Wilson and Chermak (tentatively) attributed the negative outcomes there to the activities of the street workers, which served to make loosely-structured gangs more cohesive and to further challenge the legitimacy of local law enforcement.[108] Commenting on this finding, one noted gang expert raised questions about the wisdom of using former gang members in gang interventions.[109] A recent evaluation of the Phoenix Truce initiative found similarly detrimental effects; the authors speculate that, as in some other cities' experience, "street outreach can result in the unintended consequence of increasing neighborhood levels of gang membership and delinquency," as the "assignment of caseworkers increased the local reputation of particular gangs, which helped to attract new members, and led to an increased gang problem …."[110] More generally, street outreach workers are higher-risk employees than many: Fox et al. report that three of Baltimore's five sites in its Safe Streets (Cure Violence) program were shut down within a short time. One of them was terminated after city officials "learned through local and federal law enforcement that a local street gang (the Black Guerilla Family) had infiltrated the program. Gang members, one of which was a gang leader, were working for the Union Hills Safe Streets site as outreach workers for the purpose of obtaining cover for their gang's heroin distribution network …."[111]

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Our comments with regard to focused deterrence would seem equally applicable to Cure Violence: we detect no clear need for street outreach to prevent gun violence.

Implications

We have drawn what we take to be implications by synthesizing the community input with the review of current BPD policies, programs, and practices, the results of our analyses of racial and ethnic disparities, and the research base. We would not purport to represent here the tone, sentiment, or intensity of the community input. Nor do we

Johnson, and Jennifer Avegno, "Operation CeaseFire-New Orleans: An Infectious Disease Model for Addressing Community Recidivism from Penetrating Trauma," *Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery* 77 (2014): 123-128.

[108] Jeremy M. Wilson, and Steven Chermak, "Community-Driven Violence Reduction Programs: Examining Pittsburgh's One Vision One Life," *Criminology & Public Policy* 10 (2011), especially pp. 1016-1019.

[109] Malcolm W. Klein, "Comprehensive Gang and Violence Reduction Programs," *Criminology & Public Policy* 10 (2011): 1037-1044.

[110] Fox, et al., "Evaluation of the Phoenix TRUCE Project," *op cit*, p. 110.

[111] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

presume to recommend changes that the Binghamton public or its representatives might consider a poor fit for their community. We offer these implications as a succinct compilation of matters that surely merit consideration, based on all of the foregoing.

1. Take concrete steps toward greater transparency:
   - Consider posting BPD policies on the website
   - Post an explanation of the complaint process on the website, along with the complaint form (ideally a fillable form submissible from the website)
   - Post the BPD annual report
   - Post statistical summaries of: complaints, allegations, dispositions; stops and post-stop outcomes, by race/ethnicity; arrests, by race/ethnicity; use of force, by race/ethnicity

2. Use social media, complementing the use of press releases, to inform the public about BPD's accomplishments and activities, and to notify the public when new documents are available on the website

3. Identify and institutionalize means of engaging regularly with residents, neighborhood groups and other community associations

4. Consider what if any form of external, citizen oversight to establish

5. Consider the creation of a community advisory board

6. Consider conducting periodic or rolling contact surveys as indicators of public perceptions of procedurally just policing

7. Consider the deployment of officers on foot where feasible

8. Ensure that the Community Response Team (CRT) has adequate staffing to meet citywide needs and demands for problem-solving

9. Consider (additional) training for CRT and other officers in the SARA model of problem-oriented policing and other community policing tasks

10. Institutionalize a regular review of problem-solving analysis and responses to ensure that appropriate use is made of non-enforcement responses (including but not limited to situational crime prevention)

11. Continue efforts to diversify BPD's ranks

12. Conduct a further and more detailed examination of Taser use in interactions with citizens of different race/ethnicity

13. Build on the current subject resistance form to systematically capture more detailed information on forms of force, and analyze those data for the purposes of policy development, training, and monitoring racial/ethnic disparities

14. Ensure compliance with stop reporting by auditing stop records against CAD records periodically, and analyze stop data for the purposes of policy development, training, and monitoring racial/ethnic disparities

15. Consider additional training, either by allocating additional resources for training or establishing different priorities for training, as well as cross-system training
    - Topics include (but are not limited to): implicit bias awareness; de-escalation; domestic violence

16. Continue the development of de-escalation training, apart from CIT, perhaps using PERF's ICAT curriculum.

17. Consider what if any calls for service could be handled through an alternative response, based on a careful consideration of how calls are currently disposed and the reliability of the information available at the time of dispatch

18. Consider a deflection (police-led diversion) program for substance abusers

19. Continue the reform and reinvention process, including regular opportunities for community input, beyond the April 1 deadline of the Executive Order

Appendix

As noted above, we administered a survey in order to supplement the community input obtained through the community meetings. The survey was based on what is called an "opt-in" sample: respondents who were aware of the opportunity to complete the survey could choose to participate and thus opt in. Such samples are convenience samples and they are susceptible to sample selection bias: those who opt in are liable to be unrepresentative. Segments of a population, especially those with strong opinions about the subject of the survey, can skew the survey results.

In some cases, post-hoc statistical weighting can be performed, so long as the survey data include information on the factors that influence the choice to participate in the survey, and independent information is available on those same factors in the larger population that the sample would ideally represent. That is not true in this case.

We therefore identified the respondents with extreme views about Binghamton police, on the premise that their opinions influenced their choice to participate. Extreme views could be negative or positive. We focused on 20 items to differentiate among respondents in terms of the extremity of their responses. An extreme response is one at either end of the response continuum, e.g., strongly agree or strongly disagree, very poor or very good. Those who reported an extreme response on 90% or more of 20 opinion items were treated as holding extreme views. (The median percentage of extremely negative responses was 10, and the median percentage of extremely positive responses was also 10, so those with 90 percent extreme responses were quite distinctive in the consistency and intensity of their responses.) Among the 1,206 respondents who answered items, there were 179 who were extremely negative, and 79 who were extremely positive.

We distinguish these two groups of respondents from those with less extreme views in the tables below. In so doing, we do not mean to imply that the extreme views are illegitimate or not sincerely held. Nor do we suggest that the remaining respondents, with less extreme views, can be treated as representative, for they too opted in to the survey, and we cannot estimate the representativeness of the sample or a subset thereof. The tables show these three sets of respondents separately so that readers can make their own judgments about the interpretation of the survey results. We would stress that the purpose of the survey was to supplement the input obtained through the community meetings, and should not be construed as a true statistical representation of Binghamton residents or other stakeholders.

The leadership of the Binghamton Police Department is receptive to change/innovation.				
		extremes		
		extremely negative	neither extreme	extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	141	72
	% within extremes	0.0%	14.9%	91.1%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	247	5
	% within extremes	0.0%	26.1%	6.3%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	151	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.9%	1.3%
Disagree strongly	Count	179	265	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	28.0%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	144	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.2%	1.3%
Total	Count	179	948	79
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The rank-and-file members of the Binghamton Police Department are receptive to change/innovation.				
		extremes		
		extremely negative	neither extreme	extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	153	79
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.2%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	266	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	28.1%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	159	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.8%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	178	203	0
	% within extremes	99.4%	21.4%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	1	166	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	17.5%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	947	79
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department makes it easy for community members to provide input (e.g., concerns, comments, questions).				
		extremes		
		extremely negative	neither extreme	extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	173	78
	% within extremes	0.0%	18.3%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	208	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	22.0%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	188	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	19.9%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	179	253	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	26.7%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	125	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	13.2%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	947	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police can be trusted to make the right decisions for residents in my neighborhood.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	293	78
	% within extremes	0.0%	30.9%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	228	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	24.1%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	140	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	14.8%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	179	221	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	23.3%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	65	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	6.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	947	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

I would like to see increased Binghamton Police uniformed presence in my neighborhood.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	285	61
	% within extremes	0.0%	30.1%	78.2%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	226	12
	% within extremes	0.0%	23.9%	15.4%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	126	3
	% within extremes	0.0%	13.3%	3.8%
Disagree strongly	Count	179	243	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	25.7%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	66	2
	% within extremes	0.0%	7.0%	2.6%
Total	Count	179	946	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department is working toward improving trust with historically mistreated groups.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	234	78
	% within extremes	0.0%	24.7%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	171	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	18.1%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	1	115	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	12.2%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	178	254	0
	% within extremes	99.4%	26.8%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	172	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	18.2%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	946	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Binghamton Police volunteering at community organizations would improve community trust.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	2	338	45
	% within extremes	1.1%	35.7%	57.7%
Agree somewhat	Count	9	364	16
	% within extremes	5.0%	38.4%	20.5%
Disagree somewhat	Count	6	96	6
	% within extremes	3.4%	10.1%	7.7%
Disagree strongly	Count	159	94	5
	% within extremes	88.8%	9.9%	6.4%
Don’t know	Count	3	56	6
	% within extremes	1.7%	5.9%	7.7%
Total	Count	179	948	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When dealing with the people in your neighborhood are the Binghamton Police… polite?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	355	78
	% within extremes	0.0%	37.8%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	286	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	30.5%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	2	115	0
	% within extremes	1.1%	12.2%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	177	109	0
	% within extremes	98.9%	11.6%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	74	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	7.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	939	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When dealing with the people in your neighborhood are the Binghamton Police… helpful?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	359	78
	% within extremes	0.0%	38.3%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	265	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	28.3%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	132	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	14.1%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	179	117	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	12.5%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	65	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	6.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	938	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When dealing with the people in your neighborhood are the Binghamton Police… biased?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	161	191	7
	% within extremes	89.9%	20.4%	9.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	1	184	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	19.6%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	96	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	10.2%	1.3%
Disagree strongly	Count	17	285	68
	% within extremes	9.5%	30.4%	87.2%
Don’t know	Count	0	181	2
	% within extremes	0.0%	19.3%	2.6%
Total	Count	179	937	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When dealing with the people in your neighborhood are the Binghamton Police… concerned about people's problems?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	1	274	78
	% within extremes	0.6%	29.2%	100.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	1	281	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	30.0%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	1	152	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	16.2%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	176	145	0
	% within extremes	98.3%	15.5%	0.0%
Don't know	Count	0	86	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	9.2%	0.0%
Total	Count	179	938	78
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Dealing with problems in your neighborhood				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	172	91	0
	% within extremes	99.4%	10.2%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	1	140	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	15.7%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	285	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	31.9%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	0	262	77
	% within extremes	0.0%	29.3%	100.0%
Don't know	Count	0	115	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	12.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	893	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Fighting crime				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	172	73	0
	% within extremes	99.4%	8.2%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	146	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.5%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	318	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	35.9%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	0	243	77
	% within extremes	0.0%	27.4%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	1	107	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	12.1%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	887	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Treating people fairly				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	173	165	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	18.5%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	155	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	17.4%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	186	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	20.8%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	0	273	77
	% within extremes	0.0%	30.6%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	114	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	12.8%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	893	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Keeping order on the streets and sidewalks				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	169	75	0
	% within extremes	97.7%	8.4%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	148	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.6%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	1	328	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	36.8%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	1	236	77
	% within extremes	0.6%	26.5%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	2	104	0
	% within extremes	1.2%	11.7%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	891	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Working with residents in your neighborhood to solve local problems				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	173	157	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	17.6%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	144	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.1%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	210	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	23.5%	1.3%
Disagree strongly	Count	0	200	76
	% within extremes	0.0%	22.4%	98.7%
Don’t know	Count	0	181	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	20.3%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	892	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Working to build community trust				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	173	181	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	20.3%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	164	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	18.4%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	208	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	23.3%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	0	197	77
	% within extremes	0.0%	22.1%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	142	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	173	892	77
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department are good at…Responding promptly to calls for service				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	142	77	0
	% within extremes	82.6%	8.6%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	6	142	0
	% within extremes	3.5%	15.9%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	2	270	4
	% within extremes	1.2%	30.3%	5.3%
Disagree strongly	Count	1	277	72
	% within extremes	0.6%	31.1%	94.7%
Don’t know	Count	21	125	0
	% within extremes	12.2%	14.0%	0.0%
Total	Count	172	891	76
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

If a police officer in Binghamton were found guilty of misconduct, to what extent do you think that the police department would punish the officer?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Very severely	Count	15	164	55
	% within extremes	9.1%	19.6%	76.4%
Somewhat severely	Count	0	212	16
	% within extremes	0.0%	25.4%	22.2%
Somewhat leniently	Count	0	141	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.9%	1.4%
Very leniently	Count	150	193	0
	% within extremes	90.9%	23.1%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	125	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.0%	0.0%
Total	Count	165	835	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

People of color are treated less fairly than white people when dealing with the police.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	169	316	1
	% within extremes	99.4%	36.3%	1.4%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	133	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.3%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	87	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	10.0%	1.4%
Disagree strongly	Count	1	260	72
	% within extremes	0.6%	29.9%	97.3%
Don’t know	Count	0	75	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	8.6%	0.0%
Total	Count	170	871	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Binghamton Police Department actively recruits from within the City of Binghamton to fill positions within the department.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	2	156	58
	% within extremes	1.2%	17.9%	78.4%
Agree somewhat	Count	4	150	8
	% within extremes	2.4%	17.2%	10.8%
Disagree somewhat	Count	5	70	2
	% within extremes	2.9%	8.0%	2.7%
Disagree strongly	Count	94	67	0
	% within extremes	55.3%	7.7%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	65	429	6
	% within extremes	38.2%	49.2%	8.1%
Total	Count	170	872	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

New police officers should have to live within the City of Binghamton.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	117	304	14
	% within extremes	69.2%	34.9%	18.9%
Agree somewhat	Count	18	233	14
	% within extremes	10.7%	26.8%	18.9%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	138	9
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.8%	12.2%
Disagree strongly	Count	5	139	34
	% within extremes	3.0%	16.0%	45.9%
Don’t know	Count	29	57	3
	% within extremes	17.2%	6.5%	4.1%
Total	Count	169	871	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Requiring new officers to live within the City of Binghamton will have an adverse impact on the size and the quality of the applicant pool.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	7	201	39
	% within extremes	4.1%	23.1%	52.7%
Agree somewhat	Count	3	234	12
	% within extremes	1.8%	26.9%	16.2%
Disagree somewhat	Count	4	163	8
	% within extremes	2.4%	18.7%	10.8%
Disagree strongly	Count	116	166	10
	% within extremes	68.6%	19.1%	13.5%
Don’t know	Count	39	107	5
	% within extremes	23.1%	12.3%	6.8%
Total	Count	169	871	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Binghamton police services in white neighborhoods are better compared to services in predominantly Black neighborhoods.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	157	228	0
	% within extremes	92.4%	26.1%	0.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	6	112	0
	% within extremes	3.5%	12.8%	0.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	0	93	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	10.7%	0.0%
Disagree strongly	Count	3	254	74
	% within extremes	1.8%	29.1%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	4	185	0
	% within extremes	2.4%	21.2%	0.0%
Total	Count	170	872	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Local police departments should take advantage of opportunities to acquire surplus military equipment.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	0	173	54
	% within extremes	0.0%	19.8%	74.0%
Agree somewhat	Count	0	179	9
	% within extremes	0.0%	20.5%	12.3%
Disagree somewhat	Count	3	80	3
	% within extremes	1.8%	9.2%	4.1%
Disagree strongly	Count	167	338	4
	% within extremes	98.2%	38.7%	5.5%
Don’t know	Count	0	103	3
	% within extremes	0.0%	11.8%	4.1%
Total	Count	170	873	73
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In this country, the causes of racial and ethnic disparities in criminal justice are social and economic.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	76	294	14
	% within extremes	44.7%	33.7%	18.9%
Agree somewhat	Count	20	293	16
	% within extremes	11.8%	33.6%	21.6%
Disagree somewhat	Count	3	117	10
	% within extremes	1.8%	13.4%	13.5%
Disagree strongly	Count	68	101	25
	% within extremes	40.0%	11.6%	33.8%
Don’t know	Count	3	68	9
	% within extremes	1.8%	7.8%	12.2%
Total	Count	170	873	74
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Members of the community are willing to participate in community policing partnerships.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	31	428	37
	% within extremes	18.8%	50.7%	51.4%
No	Count	110	129	22
	% within extremes	66.7%	15.3%	30.6%
Don’t know	Count	24	288	13
	% within extremes	14.5%	34.1%	18.1%
Total	Count	165	845	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The average Binghamton police officer would be interested in engaging in community policing.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	4	285	57
	% within extremes	2.4%	33.7%	79.2%
No	Count	113	193	6
	% within extremes	68.1%	22.8%	8.3%
Don’t know	Count	49	367	9
	% within extremes	29.5%	43.4%	12.5%
Total	Count	166	845	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The city will need to direct more resources to the Binghamton Police Department in order for it to meaningfully engage in community policing.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	6	417	52
	% within extremes	3.6%	49.3%	73.2%
No	Count	156	276	10
	% within extremes	94.0%	32.7%	14.1%
Don’t know	Count	4	152	9
	% within extremes	2.4%	18.0%	12.7%
Total	Count	166	845	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Most people are involved in my neighborhood.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	102	105	22
	% within extremes	61.4%	12.5%	30.6%
Agree somewhat	Count	31	274	18
	% within extremes	18.7%	32.7%	25.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	7	237	9
	% within extremes	4.2%	28.2%	12.5%
Disagree strongly	Count	6	80	16
	% within extremes	3.6%	9.5%	22.2%
Don't know	Count	20	143	7
	% within extremes	12.0%	17.0%	9.7%
Total	Count	166	839	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

People in my neighborhood often join together to work on problems.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	122	122	22
	% within extremes	73.5%	14.5%	30.6%
Agree somewhat	Count	25	303	17
	% within extremes	15.1%	36.1%	23.6%
Disagree somewhat	Count	4	166	10
	% within extremes	2.4%	19.8%	13.9%
Disagree strongly	Count	6	115	17
	% within extremes	3.6%	13.7%	23.6%
Don't know	Count	9	134	6
	% within extremes	5.4%	16.0%	8.3%
Total	Count	166	840	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

I am motivated to be involved in my neighborhood.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	131	307	41
	% within extremes	78.9%	36.5%	56.9%
Agree somewhat	Count	19	378	18
	% within extremes	11.4%	45.0%	25.0%
Disagree somewhat	Count	2	75	2
	% within extremes	1.2%	8.9%	2.8%
Disagree strongly	Count	5	18	5
	% within extremes	3.0%	2.1%	6.9%
Don't know	Count	9	62	6
	% within extremes	5.4%	7.4%	8.3%
Total	Count	166	840	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

How thoroughly would you say that the Binghamton Police Department investigates complaints about its police officers?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Very thoroughly	Count	0	196	67
	% within extremes	0.0%	23.4%	93.1%
Somewhat thoroughly	Count	0	115	3
	% within extremes	0.0%	13.8%	4.2%
Not at all thoroughly	Count	165	298	0
	% within extremes	100.0%	35.6%	0.0%
Don't know	Count	0	227	2
	% within extremes	0.0%	27.2%	2.8%
Total	Count	165	836	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

If you had reason to file a complaint against a member of the Binghamton Police Department, would you know how to go about doing so?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	27	290	62
	% within extremes	16.4%	34.8%	86.1%
No	Count	120	344	4
	% within extremes	72.7%	41.2%	5.6%
I am not sure that I know how	Count	18	200	6
	% within extremes	10.9%	24.0%	8.3%
Total	Count	165	834	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

If a police officer in Binghamton were found guilty of misconduct, to what extent do you think that the police department would punish the officer?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Very severely	Count	15	164	55
	% within extremes	9.1%	19.6%	76.4%
Somewhat severely	Count	0	212	16
	% within extremes	0.0%	25.4%	22.2%
Somewhat leniently	Count	0	141	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	16.9%	1.4%
Very leniently	Count	150	193	0
	% within extremes	90.9%	23.1%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	0	125	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	15.0%	0.0%
Total	Count	165	835	72
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Have you ever filed a complaint against a Binghamton Police officer?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	50	34	1
	% within extremes	30.3%	4.1%	1.4%
No	Count	109	799	70
	% within extremes	66.1%	95.7%	98.6%
Don’t know	Count	6	2	0
	% within extremes	3.6%	0.2%	0.0%
Total	Count	165	835	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Some Binghamton Police Department policies are posted on the Police Department website. Prior to this survey, were you aware that department policies are posted there?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	80	257	57
	% within extremes	49.1%	30.9%	80.3%
No	Count	77	550	13
	% within extremes	47.2%	66.2%	18.3%
Don’t know	Count	6	24	1
	% within extremes	3.7%	2.9%	1.4%
Total	Count	163	831	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Have you ever reviewed any of the Binghamton Police Department's policies?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	98	247	43
	% within extremes	60.5%	29.7%	60.6%
No	Count	55	572	28
	% within extremes	34.0%	68.8%	39.4%
Don’t know	Count	9	13	0
	% within extremes	5.6%	1.6%	0.0%
Total	Count	162	832	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Is the Binghamton Police Department a New York State accredited agency?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	83	400	59
	% within extremes	51.2%	48.1%	83.1%
No	Count	10	15	1
	% within extremes	6.2%	1.8%	1.4%
Don’t know	Count	69	416	11
	% within extremes	42.6%	50.1%	15.5%
Total	Count	162	831	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

How much time do you want the police around?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Same amount of time	Count	0	226	25
	% within extremes	0.0%	27.2%	35.2%
More time	Count	1	347	46
	% within extremes	0.6%	41.7%	64.8%
Less time	Count	161	187	0
	% within extremes	98.8%	22.5%	0.0%
Don't know	Count	1	72	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	8.7%	0.0%
Total	Count	163	832	71
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Many of the needed police reforms will require the City to direct more resources toward the Binghamton Police Department.				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Agree strongly	Count	2	221	40
	% within extremes	1.3%	28.0%	62.5%
Agree somewhat	Count	1	214	14
	% within extremes	0.7%	27.2%	21.9%
Disagree somewhat	Count	3	111	5
	% within extremes	2.0%	14.1%	7.8%
Disagree strongly	Count	146	169	4
	% within extremes	95.4%	21.4%	6.3%
Don’t know	Count	1	73	1
	% within extremes	0.7%	9.3%	1.6%
Total	Count	153	788	64
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Prior to opening this survey had you heard of the Binghamton Reform and Reinvention Collaborative?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	61	466	51
	% within extremes	39.9%	59.0%	78.5%
No	Count	86	306	12
	% within extremes	56.2%	38.7%	18.5%
Don’t know	Count	6	18	2
	% within extremes	3.9%	2.3%	3.1%
Total	Count	153	790	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Were you aware the Binghamton Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative held community meetings open to the public?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	53	387	53
	% within extremes	34.6%	49.0%	81.5%
No	Count	93	381	11
	% within extremes	60.8%	48.3%	16.9%
Don’t know	Count	7	21	1
	% within extremes	4.6%	2.7%	1.5%
Total	Count	153	789	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Are you aware the Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Community Meetings were recorded and are posted online?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	49	269	50
	% within extremes	32.0%	34.1%	76.9%
No	Count	96	503	11
	% within extremes	62.7%	63.8%	16.9%
Don’t know	Count	8	17	4
	% within extremes	5.2%	2.2%	6.2%
Total	Count	153	789	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Do you feel Binghamton leaders made a meaningful effort to ensure that diverse points of view are represented on the Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Steering Committee?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	0	230	55
	% within extremes	0.0%	29.1%	84.6%
No	Count	145	232	2
	% within extremes	94.8%	29.4%	3.1%
Don’t know	Count	8	328	8
	% within extremes	5.2%	41.5%	12.3%
Total	Count	153	790	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Do you feel Binghamton's leaders and the members of the Reform and Reinvention Collaborative worked hard to gather community input?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	3	225	54
	% within extremes	2.0%	28.4%	83.1%
No	Count	137	262	5
	% within extremes	89.5%	33.1%	7.7%
Don’t know	Count	13	304	6
	% within extremes	8.5%	38.4%	9.2%
Total	Count	153	791	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When was the last time, if ever, that you had contact with the Binghamton Police Department?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Within the past 12 months	Count	87	433	43
	% within extremes	56.9%	54.7%	66.2%
1-5 years ago	Count	20	210	8
	% within extremes	13.1%	26.5%	12.3%
More than 5 years ago	Count	4	68	9
	% within extremes	2.6%	8.6%	13.8%
Never	Count	27	58	5
	% within extremes	17.6%	7.3%	7.7%
Don’t know	Count	15	22	0
	% within extremes	9.8%	2.8%	0.0%
Total	Count	153	791	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

What was the reason for your most recent contact with the Binghamton Police?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Other (please specify)	Count	13	125	10
	% within extremes	10.4%	17.2%	16.7%
You contacted the police to report a crime	Count	4	158	9
	% within extremes	3.2%	21.8%	15.0%
You contacted the police for assistance or information	Count	13	131	16
	% within extremes	10.4%	18.1%	26.7%
You were involved in a traffic accident	Count	2	42	6
	% within extremes	1.6%	5.8%	10.0%
You were stopped by the police on foot or in a car	Count	48	63	5
	% within extremes	38.4%	8.7%	8.3%
You were arrested	Count	2	3	1
	% within extremes	1.6%	0.4%	1.7%
Community event	Count	17	92	4
	% within extremes	13.6%	12.7%	6.7%
The police contacted you for some other reason	Count	8	80	5
	% within extremes	6.4%	11.0%	8.3%
Don't know	Count	18	31	4
	% within extremes	14.4%	4.3%	6.7%
Total	Count	125	725	60
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Regarding this recent contact, did you have any reason to complain about any aspect of police services provided by the Binghamton Police Department?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	101	148	1
	% within extremes	80.8%	20.4%	1.7%
No	Count	11	549	59
	% within extremes	8.8%	75.7%	98.3%
Don’t know	Count	13	28	0
	% within extremes	10.4%	3.9%	0.0%
Total	Count	125	725	60
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Did you or any member of your household make a complaint?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Yes	Count	50	28	0
	% within extremes	43.9%	16.0%	0.0%
No	Count	52	136	0
	% within extremes	45.6%	77.7%	0.0%
Don’t know	Count	12	11	1
	% within extremes	10.5%	6.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	114	175	1
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

To whom did you complain?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Other (please specify)	Count	4	5	0
	% within extremes	6.5%	12.2%	0.0%
Police chief	Count	3	3	0
	% within extremes	4.8%	7.3%	0.0%
Called police department and talked to person who answered or to whom I was directed	Count	4	12	0
	% within extremes	6.5%	29.3%	0.0%
Mayor	Count	34	5	0
	% within extremes	54.8%	12.2%	0.0%
Called city hall and talked to person who answered or to whom I was directed	Count	7	2	1
	% within extremes	11.3%	4.9%	100.0%
Don’t know	Count	10	14	0
	% within extremes	16.1%	34.1%	0.0%
Total	Count	62	41	1
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

How satisfied were you with the handling of your complaint?				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Somewhat satisfied	Count	0	1	1
	% within extremes	0.0%	2.5%	100.0%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Count	0	4	0
	% within extremes	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Very dissatisfied	Count	56	23	0
	% within extremes	90.3%	57.5%	0.0%
Don't know	Count	6	12	0
	% within extremes	9.7%	30.0%	0.0%
Total	Count	62	40	1
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Community outreach programs in which police engage directly with community members to build relationships, seek input, and solve problems would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	27	453	32
	% within extremes	17.2%	56.8%	50.8%
Improve police-community relations	Count	22	641	49
	% within extremes	14.0%	80.4%	77.8%
Improve trust	Count	20	570	41
	% within extremes	12.7%	71.5%	65.1%
None of the above	Count	124	77	12
	% within extremes	79.0%	9.7%	19.0%
Don't know	Count	1	36	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	4.5%	0.0%
Total	Count	157	797	63
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Collecting and making available data on police activities, broken out by race, gender, and other relevant demographic markers would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	90	361	14
	% within extremes	57.3%	45.4%	21.9%
Improve police-community relations	Count	62	365	20
	% within extremes	39.5%	45.9%	31.3%
Improve trust	Count	72	421	22
	% within extremes	45.9%	53.0%	34.4%
None of the above	Count	56	195	32
	% within extremes	35.7%	24.5%	50.0%
Don't know	Count	7	90	6
	% within extremes	4.5%	11.3%	9.4%
Total	Count	157	795	64
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Enhanced partnerships among police and social service agencies would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	29	386	14
	% within extremes	18.5%	48.4%	21.5%
Improve police-community relations	Count	36	548	35
	% within extremes	22.9%	68.8%	53.8%
Improve trust	Count	30	445	31
	% within extremes	19.1%	55.8%	47.7%
None of the above	Count	115	121	23
	% within extremes	73.2%	15.2%	35.4%
Don't know	Count	1	72	4
	% within extremes	0.6%	9.0%	6.2%
Total	Count	157	797	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Convening regular police-community community forum sessions would help to...(select all that apply)				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	20	298	17
	% within extremes	12.7%	37.4%	26.2%
Improve police-community relations	Count	31	546	35
	% within extremes	19.7%	68.6%	53.8%
Improve trust	Count	19	116	21
	% within extremes	12.1%	14.6%	32.3%
None of the above	Count	117	116	21
	% within extremes	74.5%	14.6%	32.3%
Don't know	Count	5	79	3
	% within extremes	3.2%	9.9%	4.6%
Total	Count	157	796	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Police engagement with youth outside of school would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	12	381	26
	% within extremes	7.6%	47.8%	40.0%
Improve police-community relations	Count	13	581	52
	% within extremes	8.3%	72.9%	80.0%
Improve trust	Count	11	556	47
	% within extremes	7.0%	69.8%	72.3%
None of the above	Count	141	101	5
	% within extremes	89.8%	12.7%	7.7%
Don't know	Count	1	43	0
	% within extremes	0.6%	5.4%	0.0%
Total	Count	157	797	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Police engagement with youth in schools would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	6	339	25
	% within extremes	3.8%	42.5%	38.5%
Improve police-community relations	Count	7	505	51
	% within extremes	4.5%	63.3%	78.5%
Improve trust	Count	7	506	49
	% within extremes	4.5%	63.4%	75.4%
None of the above	Count	149	167	4
	% within extremes	94.9%	20.9%	6.2%
Don't know	Count	1	53	1
	% within extremes	0.6%	6.6%	1.5%
Total	Count	157	798	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Increasing the diversity of the police department would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	25	479	22
	% within extremes	16.0%	60.1%	33.8%
Improve police-community relations	Count	16	430	28
	% within extremes	10.3%	54.0%	43.1%
Improve trust	Count	18	423	26
	% within extremes	11.5%	53.1%	40.0%
None of the above	Count	119	167	27
	% within extremes	76.3%	21.0%	41.5%
Don't know	Count	11	60	4
	% within extremes	7.1%	7.5%	6.2%
Total	Count	156	797	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Anti-bias, diversity and inclusion training for officers would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	35	487	24
	% within extremes	22.3%	61.2%	36.9%
Improve police-community relations	Count	17	423	28
	% within extremes	10.8%	53.1%	43.1%
Improve trust	Count	20	411	25
	% within extremes	12.7%	51.6%	38.5%
None of the above	Count	110	161	21
	% within extremes	70.1%	20.2%	32.3%
Don't know	Count	10	66	6
	% within extremes	6.4%	8.3%	9.2%
Total	Count	157	796	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Training officers in responding to mental health situations would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	25	322	15
	% within extremes	15.9%	40.4%	23.1%
Improve police-community relations	Count	25	511	36
	% within extremes	15.9%	64.0%	55.4%
Improve trust	Count	30	149	22
	% within extremes	19.1%	18.7%	33.8%
None of the above	Count	115	149	22
	% within extremes	73.2%	18.7%	33.8%
Don't know	Count	11	59	3
	% within extremes	7.0%	7.4%	4.6%
Total	Count	157	798	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.05

Training officers in de-escalation techniques would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	28	345	16
	% within extremes	17.8%	43.2%	24.6%
Improve police-community relations	Count	33	549	33
	% within extremes	21.0%	68.8%	50.8%
Improve trust	Count	32	526	32
	% within extremes	20.4%	65.9%	49.2%
None of the above	Count	106	99	19
	% within extremes	67.5%	12.4%	29.2%
Don't know	Count	11	44	4
	% within extremes	7.0%	5.5%	6.2%
Total	Count	157	798	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Training officers in community policing and problem solving would help to...				
		extremes		
		Extremely negative	Neither extreme	Extremely positive
Reduce bias/disparity	Count	18	338	18
	% within extremes	11.5%	42.4%	27.7%
Improve police-community relations	Count	28	573	42
	% within extremes	17.8%	71.8%	64.6%
Improve trust	Count	23	494	31
	% within extremes	14.6%	61.9%	47.7%
None of the above	Count	116	89	15
	% within extremes	73.9%	11.2%	23.1%
Don't know	Count	11	73	4
	% within extremes	7.0%	9.1%	6.2%
Total	Count	157	798	65
	% within extremes	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Please review the map above and select the neighborhood in which you currently reside.		
	Frequency	Percent
Other within the city of Binghamton (please specify)	17	1.2
South Side West	196	13.6
South Side East	106	7.4
Center City	68	4.7
West Side	381	26.5
First Ward/Ely Park	76	5.3
North Side	78	5.4
East Side	133	9.3
Do not live in the city of Binghamton	346	24.1
Don't know	34	2.4
Total	1435	99.9
Missing	2	.1
Total	1437	100.0

Please review the map above and select the zone in which you currently reside.

	Frequency	Percent
Zone 200	75	5.2
Zone 201	215	15.0
Zone 202	116	8.1
Zone 203	208	14.5
Zone 204	96	6.7
Zone 205	137	9.5
Zone 206	79	5.5
Zone 207	66	4.6
Zone 209	23	1.6
Don't know	81	5.6
NA/Don't reside in Binghamton	332	23.1
Total	1428	99.4
Missing	9	.6
Total	1437	100.0

Do you work in the City of Binghamton?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	695	48.4
No	711	49.5
Don't know	11	.8
Total	1417	98.6
Missing	20	1.4
Total	1437	100.0

What is your age?		
	Frequency	Percent
Under 18	4	.3
18-24	76	5.3
25-34	216	15.0
35-44	216	15.0
45-54	178	12.4
55-64	180	12.5
65+	127	8.8
Total	997	69.4
Missing	440	30.6
Total	1437	100.0

q0056 With what gender do you identify?		
	Frequency	Percent
Other (please specify)	22	1.5
Male	437	30.4
Female	535	37.2
Total	994	69.2
Missing	443	30.8
Total	1437	100.0

What race do you consider yourself to be?		
	Frequency	Percent
Other (please specify)	74	5.1
White or Caucasian	795	55.3
Black or African American	109	7.6
Asian or Asian American	11	.8
American Indian or Alaska Native	3	.2
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander	3	.2
Total	995	69.2
Missing	442	30.8
Total	1437	100.0

Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin?		
	Frequency	Percent
Yes	52	3.6
No	918	63.9
Don't know	24	1.7
Total	994	69.2
Missing	443	30.8
Total	1437	100.0

Do you own or rent your current residence? For the purpose of the survey, you own your home even if you have outstanding debt that you owe on your mortgage loan.		
	Frequency	Percent
Other (please specify)	21	1.5
Own	679	47.3
Rent	282	19.6
Don't Know	16	1.1
Total	998	69.5
Missing	439	30.5
Total	1437	100.0

If you live/lived in the City of Binghamton, how long have you lived here?		
	Frequency	Percent
10+ years	585	40.7
6-9 years	107	7.4
2-5 years	162	11.3
0-1 year	32	2.2
I have never lived in Binghamton	88	6.1
Don't Know	23	1.6
Total	997	69.4
Missing	440	30.6
Total	1437	100.0